A NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURT FOR WEST
AFRICA: THE ECOWAS COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE
By Karen J. Alter,* Laurence R. Helfer,† and Jacqueline R. McAllister‡
The Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS Court) is an increasingly active and bold adjudicator of human rights. Since acquiring jurisdiction over human rights complaints in 2005, the ECOWAS Court has issued numerous decisions condemning human rights violations by the member states of the Economic
Community of West African States (Community).1 Among this Court’s path-breaking cases2
are judgments against Niger for condoning modern forms of slavery and against Nigeria for
impeding the right to free basic education for all children.3 The ECOWAS Court also has broad
access and standing rules that permit individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
to bypass national courts and file suits directly with the Court. Although the Court is generally
careful in the proof that it requires of complainants and in the remedies that it demands of governments, it has not shied away from politically courageous decisions, such as rulings against
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Fifteen nations are currently members of ECOWAS: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
2
A list of all judgments and rulings of the ECOWAS Court, as well as copies of selected decisions, are available
on the Court’s website. ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, List of Decided Cases from 2004 Till Date, at
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option!com_content&view!article&id!157&Itemid!27.
The first five years of judgments and rulings have been published in an official reporter, but it is not widely available. 2004 –2009 COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE, ECOWAS LAW REPORT (2011). Selected decisions, some
in unofficial translation, are available on other online databases. E.g., Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, African Human Rights Case Law Database, at http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-institution/
ecowas-ccj.html; WorldCourts, ECOWAS Community Court of Justice: Decisions, at http://www.worldcourts.com/
ecowasccj/eng/.
3
E.g., Lydia Polgreen, Court Rules Niger Failed by Allowing Girl’s Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008,
at A6; ECOWAS Court Orders Gambia to Pay Musa Saidykhan $200,000 in Landmark Case, JOLLOFNEWS (Dec. 16,
2010), at http://www.jollofnews.com/human-rights/1629-ecowas-court-orders-gambia-to-pay-musa-saidykhan200000-?in-landmark-case-; African Child Information Hub, West Africa: ECOWAS Court Orders Nigeria to Provide
Free Education for Every Child (Dec. 2, 2010), at http://www.africanchildinfo.net/index.php?option!com_
k2&view!item&id!5046%3Awest-africa-ecowas-court-orders-nigeria-to-provide-free-education-for-everychild&Itemid!67&lang!en#; Amnesty International, Nigeria: Ground-Breaking Judgment Calls for Punishing
Oil Companies over Pollution (Dec. 17, 2012), at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/nigeria-ground-breakingjudgment-calls-punishing-oil-companies-over-pollution-2012-12-17.
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the Gambia for the torture of journalists and against Nigeria for failing to regulate multinational companies that have degraded the environment of the oil-rich Niger Delta.
Our primary goal in this article is to explain how an international tribunal, initially established to help build a common market, was redeployed as a human rights court. In particular,
we ask why West African governments, which set up the ECOWAS Court in a way that has
allowed persistent flouting of Community economic rules, later delegated to ECOWAS judges
remarkably far-reaching human rights jurisdiction.
The ECOWAS Court’s transformation is surprising in many ways. By all accounts, ECOWAS
has made little progress toward its professed goal of regional economic integration. Trade flows
among West African nations remain extremely low; tariffs, customs regulations, nontariff
barriers, and roadblocks hinder cross-border economic transactions;4 and member states have
yet to challenge barriers to intraregional trade before the ECOWAS Court. If our story ended
here, with a new international court struggling for relevance, few would be surprised. However,
our story takes a sharp and unexpected turn in 2005 with an expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction to include human rights complaints by private litigants.
When we began our study, we had low expectations for the ECOWAS Court. Human rights
violations, destabilizing coups, and civil unrest are sadly commonplace in West Africa, and
domestic legal institutions are generally weak.5 We anticipated that national governments in
such a region would resist giving an international court the power to review human rights
claims from private litigants. And if officials did give the court such authority, we expected that
they would put in place political checks to carefully control the judges and their decisions.
What we found— based on a review of ECOWAS Court decisions and more than two dozen
interviews with judges, Community officers, government officials, attorneys, and NGOs6—
was quite different. The member states gave the ECOWAS Court a broad human rights jurisdiction, and they have eschewed opportunities to narrow the Court’s authority.
The ECOWAS Court’s repurposing and subsequent survival as an international human
rights court have several unexpected dimensions. First, the Court did not claim human rights
competence for itself via judicial lawmaking. Rather, it acquired this authority in response to
a coordinated campaign in which bar associations, NGOs, and ECOWAS officials—in addition to ECOWAS Court judges themselves—mobilized to secure member states’ consent to the
transformation. Second, the Court has strikingly capacious jurisdiction and access rules, with
no specified catalogue of human rights, with direct access for private litigants, and with no
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. These design features are especially curious because
West African states have been reluctant to grant similar authority to the judicial institutions
4

S. K. B. Asante, Economic Community of West African States, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF
( Joël Krieger ed., 2d ed. 2001).
5
See, e.g., Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Investing in Peace and Security in Africa: The Case of ECOWAS, in SECURITY
AND DEVELOPMENT: INVESTING IN PEACE AND PROSPERITY 337, 351 (Robert Picciotto & Rachel Weaving
eds., 2006); Eghosa E. Osaghae, Human Rights and Transition Societies in West Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES 315, 315 (Shale Asher Horowitz & Albrecht
Schnabel eds., 2004); ISSAKA K. SOUARÉ, CIVIL WARS AND COUPS D’ÉTAT IN WEST AFRICA: AN ATTEMPT
TO UNDERSTAND THE ROOTS AND PRESCRIBE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 135 (2006).
6
To preserve anonymity in accordance with the approval granted by our universities’ institutional review boards,
unless expressly requested by our sources, the names of our interviewees have been redacted. Each interview is identified here by date, location, and category, and by a unique identifying letter that is used in our records of all interviews.
THE WORLD 233, 234
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of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights7 (African Charter).Third, when the
ECOWAS Court’s early rulings generated opposition from some governments, the member
states eschewed opportunities to rein in the Court. Instead, they adopted institutional reforms
that arguably strengthen the judges’ independence and authority. Nevertheless, the Court faces
an ongoing challenge of securing compliance with its judgments, a challenge that the judges
are attempting to meet by tailoring the remedies that they award to successful applicants and
by publicly pressuring governments to implement the Court’s rulings.
Our study of the ECOWAS Court’s transformation has two broader theoretical implications.8 The first relates to how international institutions, including courts, evolve over time.
Rationalist theories of cooperation generally conceive of international institutions as problemsolving devices to further states’ functional goals. We contrast rationalist approaches that tether
institutions to the states that created them to historical institutionalist accounts that expect
institutions to evolve in response to political contestation and societal pressures. States nevertheless play an important part in our narrative, particularly through their decisions in the
1990s to authorize humanitarian intervention in West Africa and expand ECOWAS’s regional
security role. We argue that these decisions triggered a cascade of smaller reforms in the Community that, in the mid-2000s, created an opening for an alliance of civil society groups and
supranational actors to mobilize in favor of court reform.
A second theoretical implication relates to the repurposing of international courts. The
ECOWAS Court’s shift into human rights is not unique. The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
made an equivalent shift in the 1970s. More recently, courts associated with other subregional
economic communities—most notably, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) and the
Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community (SADC Tribunal)— have made
similar moves. In all three instances, however, the judges themselves asserted the authority to
adjudicate human rights claims. In Africa, the political and legal consequences of these bold
assertions of competence are still unfolding, but early evidence indicates that the EACJ and the
SADC Tribunal have faced greater opposition from governments than has the ECOWAS
Court.9 We argue that the manner by which an international court acquires a human rights
jurisdiction matters, for reasons we will elaborate.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the founding of ECOWAS
and the ECOWAS Court, and the expansion of the Community’s role in regional security. We
explain that member states added a tribunal to ECOWAS as part of a wider re-launch of regional
integration in the early 1990s. Yet they also rejected a proposal to give private litigants access
to the Court to facilitate enforcement of regional economic rules. As a result, the Court sat
unused for several years.
7
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 UNTS 217, 21 ILM 58 (1982)
[hereinafter African Charter].
8
This theoretical account builds on our prior work. See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (forthcoming 2014); Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, Nature
or Nurture? Judicial Law-Making in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 64 INT’L ORG.
563 (2010); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
9
E.g., Solomon Tamarabrakemi Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-regional Courts in Africa, 17 AFR.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 79 (2009); James Gathii, The Under-appreciated Jurisprudence of Africa’s Regional Trade Judiciaries, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 245 (2010); Lucyline Nkatha Murungi & Jacqui Gallinetti, The Role of Sub-regional
Courts in the African Human Rights System, 7 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 119 (2010).
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Part II begins by summarizing the dismissal of the ECOWAS Court’s first case—a suit by a
private trader challenging a border closure. The case served as the catalyst for a campaign by
bar associations, NGOs, Community officials, and ECOWAS judges, which resulted in the
2005 Protocol that gives the Court broad human rights jurisdiction.10 After summarizing the
rationales and mobilization campaign behind the 2005 Protocol, we analyze three distinctive
features of the restructured Court’s design— direct access for private parties, the absence of
ECOWAS-specific human rights standards, and non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
In part III we evaluate the ECOWAS Court’s track record as a human rights tribunal. We
focus on three major challenges to the Court’s authority—a controversial election decision that
engendered criticism from the public and legal elites in Nigeria; a proposal by the Gambia to
narrow the Court’s jurisdiction in response to rulings declaring the government responsible for
torture; and concerns relating to noncompliance with ECOWAS Court rulings. We explain
how the Court has weathered these challenges by mobilizing supportive constituencies, adjusting the remedies it orders, and publicly cajoling governments to implement its decisions.
Part IV considers the theoretical implications of our analysis, contrasting rationalist international relations and historical institutionalist theories of institutional change. We explain
how the strategy that advocates adopted— conflating the economic goals of ECOWAS with its
human rights objectives— contributed to the ironic result that an international court established to promote regional integration now adjudicates cases involving high-profile human
rights violations while remaining largely unavailable to traders and other economic actors in
the region.
In part V, we conclude by assessing the implications of the ECOWAS Court’s transformation
for the survival prospects of Africa’s other subregional courts and for broader debates about
fragmentation and the coherent interpretation of international human rights law.
I. THE POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF ECOWAS
AND ITS COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE
This part discusses the motives for establishing an economic integration regime in West
Africa and why the commitment of ECOWAS member states to this regime has remained shallow. We then explain how, in the 1990s, the Community became involved in regional security
and good governance issues, which later created a political opening to transform the ECOWAS
Court. We conclude by linking the creation of the Court to these developments and explaining
the member states’ rejection of a proposal to grant private litigants direct access to the Court.
The Founding of ECOWAS and the Barriers to Economic Integration in West Africa
Why were West African governments interested in economic integration? At the founding
of ECOWAS in 1975, the Community’s primary goals, as defined by the Treaty, were to promote cooperation and development in a wide array of issue areas, including commerce, agriculture, natural resources, monetary and financial policy, security, and social and cultural mat10
Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/01/05 Amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 9 and 30 of Protocol
(A/P.1/7/91) Relating to the Community Court of Justice and Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the English Version of the
Said Protocol, Jan. 19, 2005 [hereinafter 2005 Protocol], at http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/
supplementary_protocol.pdf.
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ters.11 The project included removing intraregional trade barriers, reflecting the conventional
view that open markets attract foreign investment and encourage development. Member states
understood from the project’s inception, however, that integration of national markets would
be only one of many ECOWAS objectives.12
The names given to ECOWAS institutions mimicked their European Community counterparts. In reality, however, the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty created a system of policymaking bodies
that governments tightly controlled. The principal Community institutions included an
Authority of Heads of State and Government (Authority), the highest ECOWAS decisionmaking body; a Council of Ministers, which served in an advisory capacity to the Authority;
and an Executive Secretariat responsible for the day-to-day administration of ECOWAS policies. These bodies adopted initiatives that, on paper, committed governments to phase out
quantitative and other restrictions on intraregional trade, create a customs union, establish a
common commercial policy, and permit the free movement of goods and persons.13
In reality, the legal framework required to carry out these policies was lacking. The institutions created by the 1975 Treaty, unlike those of the European Community, “left national
sovereignty intact.”14 The decisions of the Authority and the Council of Ministers were binding only on ECOWAS institutions. They had no legal force for member states, which had
merely agreed to “make every effort to plan and direct their policies with a view to creating
favourable conditions for the achievement of” the Community’s aims.15 In the absence of delegated supranational decision-making powers, ECOWAS policies were formulated using a
standard tool of public international law—a series of protocols adopted unanimously that
accorded each government discretion with respect to ratification and implementation, and that
entered into force only after a majority of countries had ratified. This cumbersome and politicized decision-making process was a “slow and inadequate” mechanism for Community lawmaking.16
At a deeper level, there was also good reason to question the economic and political logic of
a West African integration project. ECOWAS countries are geographically proximate, and
instability in one nation can easily destabilize neighboring countries. But in other respects, the
divisions among the member states were and remain profound. Regional infrastructure is woefully underdeveloped, which makes intraregional trade costly.17 Francophone countries are
deeply linked to France’s economic and political system, whereas Nigeria and Ghana—the two
11

Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 1010 UNTS 17, 14 ILM 1200.
The economic theory motivating the creation of ECOWAS is discussed in KOFI OTENG KUFUOR, THE INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 2– 8 (2006).
13
Charles D. Jebuni, The Role of ECOWAS in Trade Liberalization, in TRADE REFORM AND REGIONAL
INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 489, 493 (Zubair Iqbal & Mohsin S. Khan eds., 1998).
14
Committee of Eminent Persons for the Review of the ECOWAS Treaty, Final Report 16 ( June 1992)
[hereinafter Final CEP Report] (on file with authors).
15
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, supra note 11, Art. 3.
16
S. K. B. ASANTE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM IN AFRICA: A DECADE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) 70 (1986); see also MUHAMMED TAWFIQ LADAN,
INTRODUCTION TO ECOWAS COMMUNITY LAW AND PRACTICE: INTEGRATION, MIGRATION, HUMAN
RIGHTS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, PEACE AND SECURITY 7 (2009) (explaining that “most often, Community texts
adopted in the so-called areas of sovereignty were in the form of protocols, and there was considerable delay in their
application owing to the slow pace of protocol ratification”).
17
Chukwuma Agu, Obstacles to Regional Integration: The Human Factor Challenge to Trade Facilitation and Port
Reforms in Nigeria, 2 INT’L J. PRIVATE L. 445 (2009).
12
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largest Anglophone economies— have different capabilities and economic goals.18 The key
trading partners for West African countries are outside of the region, and the little intraregional
trade that occurs involves natural resources, agricultural products, and low-value-added consumption products such as rubber, plastics, and cosmetics.19 Although some traders stand to
benefit from easier access to regional markets, many local producers actively seek to avoid competition from firms in other ECOWAS countries.20
Building a common market in West Africa was nonetheless attractive for a different reason.
The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty signaled to its poorer neighbors that Nigeria—the “big brother”21
of West Africa, which then accounted for nearly 70 percent of the region’s total GDP22—favored regional cooperation. ECOWAS helped Nigeria to consolidate its status as regional hegemon by indicating to neighboring countries that they would benefit from Nigeria’s oil wealth
and from access to its large and lucrative market.23 For example, the Community’s goal of promoting the free movement of workers could enable desperately poor West Africans to move
to a country where jobs and resources were more plentiful.24 Nigeria’s financial backing was
also important. In 1975, import and export taxes ranged from 15 to 50 percent of national
revenues.25 Governments envisioned that ECOWAS would replace these tax proceeds with a
Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development. All member states were required to
contribute to the fund, but in proportion to each country’s gross domestic product and per
capita income. Nigerian largesse thus provided the bulk of the Community revenue to replace
domestic trade taxes.26 It also provided extra funds to support the activities of Community
institutions.27
Notwithstanding this planned reduction in trade taxes, ECOWAS did not endorse a free
market philosophy. To the contrary, its policies reflected the then widely held view that industrialized countries preyed on the economic weaknesses of the developing world. The remedy
for this dependency, according to this view, was to build local industrial capacity and an export
18
E.g., ASANTE, supra note 16, at 48; Julius Emeka Okolo, The Development and Structure of ECOWAS, in WEST
AFRICAN REGIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 19, 42 ( Julius Emeka Okolo & Stephen Wright eds.,
1990).
19
Mary E. Burfisher & Margaret B. Missiaen, Intraregional Trade in West Africa, in WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 185–213; Phoebe Kornfeld, ECOWAS, The First Decade:
Towards Collective Self-Reliance, or Maintenance of the Status Quo?, in WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL COOPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 87, 91 (noting that intraregional trade averaged between 2.8 percent and
4.1 percent of the member states’ total trade volume during the first ten years of ECOWAS). These trade volumes
have remained stable since the 1970s. IBRAHIM A. GAMBARI, POLITICAL AND COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS OF
REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF ECOWAS 40 – 41 (1991).
20
E.g., Agu, supra note 17, at 455; Kofi Oteng Kufuor, Sub-state Protectionism in Ghana, 18 AFR. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 78, 80 – 81 (2010).
21
E.g., OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN, AFRICA IN GLOBAL POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A
PAN-AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 42 (2009) (explaining that “Nigeria has become the big brother (Super power) of
West Africa”).
22
Okolo, supra note 18, at 42.
23
GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 18; KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 22; Olatunde Ojo, Nigeria and the Formation of
ECOWAS, 34 INT’L ORG. 571, 584 (1980).
24
Julius Emeka Okolo, Free Movement of Persons in ECOWAS and Nigeria’s Expulsion of Illegal Aliens, 40 WORLD
TODAY 428, 431 (1984).
25
GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 42; Okolo, supra note 18, at 49 n.43.
26
Okolo, supra note 18, at 32 (explaining that Nigeria provided nearly one-third of the contributions to the
Community fund).
27
GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 58.
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sector to replace reliance on foreign imports.28 Nigeria, in particular, favored a region-wide
effort to build indigenous industries.29 The Francophone countries, however, were heavily
dependent on investment from France, and foreign investors were primarily interested in
gaining access to regional markets. Voting as a bloc, the Francophone members of ECOWAS
prevented the adoption of Community rules of origin. Anglophone members reacted, in
turn, by opposing free-trade rules that would have given French producers open access to
their markets.30 The net result of these intraregional tensions was a stalemate within ECOWAS
and rampant noncompliance with Community rules.31 Not surprisingly, assessments of
the on-the-ground impact of the first phase of West African integration were overwhelmingly
negative.32
The Rise of Regional Security, Good Governance, and Human Rights in ECOWAS
The 1980s was a period of economic turmoil and political conflict in West Africa. Early in
the decade, the collapse of world oil prices and the mismanagement of oil revenues led Nigeria
to focus on domestic priorities and deemphasize its commitment to ECOWAS.33 A further
low point followed in 1983 when Nigeria expelled hundreds of thousands of “illegal” workers
from other member states. Mass expulsions had occurred before in West Africa. But the 1975
ECOWAS Treaty and its free-movement protocols professed a commitment to a different and
more open migration policy.34 Nigeria’s expulsions increased employment opportunities for
domestic workers and thus were politically popular at home. But they were widely viewed as
flouting the spirit, if not the letter, of ECOWAS free-movement rules.35
The end of the Cold War had a significant impact on the Community. West African countries began to liberalize their economies as a condition of receiving loans from the World Bank,
gaining access to European markets and, eventually, joining the World Trade Organization.
These powerful external forces made the embrace of regional economic integration newly
attractive.36
The revival and expansion of ECOWAS was embodied in a new agreement, the 1993
Treaty,37 that replaced the 1975 founding charter. The 1993 Treaty recommitted West African governments to economic integration, setting timetables for establishing the customs and
monetary unions, and further reducing barriers to intraregional trade. The member states also
endorsed structural changes to achieve these goals. They authorized certain ECOWAS decisions
28

ASANTE, supra note 16, at 42– 43; GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 42– 43; KUFUOR, supra note 12, at xii.
KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 27.
30
Id. at 26 –29.
31
GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 44; Jebuni, supra note 13, at 495.
32
E.g., KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 19 –34; Jebuni, supra note 13, at 490 –99.
33
GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 47.
34
E.g., Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, Art. 2.1,
May 29, 1979, at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id!protocole&lang!en; see also ASANTE, supra
note 16, at 151 (“As far as ECOWAS is concerned, the movement of labor is part of the philosophy of its
founders . . . .”).
35
Okolo, supra note 24, at 432–33; GAMBARI, supra note 19, at 47.
36
KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 42– 43.
37
Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, July 24, 1993, 35 ILM 660 [hereinafter
1993 Treaty].
29
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to be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the member states, made those decisions expressly binding on the member states, created new ECOWAS institutions such as the Community Parliament,38 and increased the power of existing bodies.39
Although the 1993 Treaty reads primarily as a recommitment to economic integration, in
practice the second phase of ECOWAS came to be dominated by security, good governance,
and human rights concerns. Early on, the Community had acquired a role in promoting
regional security. A 1978 Protocol on Non-aggression40 and a 1981 Protocol Relating to
Mutual Assistance on Defense41 provided the legal basis for these tasks. These initiatives were
primarily aimed at deflecting foreign interventions, but they also established a Defense Council
and Defense Commission that could more broadly supervise regional security initiatives.42
The Liberian civil war marked a turning point. Although there had been previous conflicts
in the region, the civil war in that country led Anglophone member states to establish the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).43 What began as
a monitoring and mediation effort as part of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense
became a full-fledged military intervention.44 Most observers credited the intervention with
preventing the spread of violence and restoring a semblance of stability in Liberia. But the intervention also generated credible and serious allegations of human rights abuses by ECOMOG
forces.45 Subsequent military missions to quell civil wars and armed conflicts in Sierra Leone
in 1997, Guinea Bissau in 1999, and Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia in 2003 increased the political
salience of security and humanitarian activities in ECOWAS and led to the adoption in 1999
of a Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peace-Keeping and Security (1999 Conflict Prevention Protocol) that underscored the importance of protecting human rights and put regional intervention on a firmer legal footing.46
These expansions of the Community’s powers contributed to a growing mobilization around
38
Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the Community Parliament, Aug. 6, 1994, at http://www.parl.ecowas.int/
doc/protocols_eng.pdf.
39
For an overview of the 1993 Treaty, see KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 35– 68; Iwa Akinrinsola, Legal and Institutional Requirements for West African Economic Integration, 10 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 493, 504 – 08 (2004).
40
Apr. 22, 1978, in COMPENDIUM OF ECOWAS PEACE & SECURITY DECISIONS 57 (Emmanuel Kwesi
Aning, Emma Birikorang & Thomas Jaye eds., 2010), at http://www.kaiptc.org/getattachment/MediaRoom/News/Compendium-of-ECOWAS-Peace-and-Security-Decisions/Compendium-of-ECOWAS-Peace-andSecurity-Decisions.pdf.aspx.
41
A/SP3/5/8l, May 29, 1981, in COMPENDIUM OF ECOWAS PEACE & SECURITY DECISIONS, supra note 40,
at 61.
42
See Peter Jenkins, The Economic Community of West African States and the Regional Use of Force, 32 DENV.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 333, 335–36 (2008).
43
JOHN M. KABIA, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA
57–160 (2009); see also ADEKEYE ADEBAJO & ISMAIL O. D. RASHID, WEST AFRICA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES:
BUILDING PEACE IN A TROUBLED REGION (2004).
44
See Jenkins, supra note 42, at 342– 44.
45
E.g., Peter Arthur, ECOWAS and Regional Peacekeeping Integration in West Africa: Lessons for the Future,
57 AFRICA TODAY 2, 16 (2010); KABIA, supra note 43, at 86 – 87.
46
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping
and Security, Art. 2, Dec. 10, 1999 (declaring as a “fundamental principles” the “protection of fundamental
human rights and freedoms and the rules of international humanitarian laws”), in COMPENDIUM OF ECOWAS
PEACE & SECURITY DECISIONS, supra note 40, at 61; see also Isaac Terwase Sampson, The Responsibility to Protect
and ECOWAS Mechanisms on Peace and Security: Assessing Their Convergence and Divergence on Intervention,
16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 507, 515–18 (2011).
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human rights in West Africa, and as we explain in part IV, opened the door for the transformation of the ECOWAS Court into an international human rights court.
As part of the 1993 overhaul, member states agreed to broaden public participation in
ECOWAS by expanding access for civil society groups. National NGOs were precluded from
participating in Community policymaking, but regional civil society groups could be accredited to observe public meetings, make presentations, and circulate documents.47 These institutional reforms created an incentive for civil society groups to mobilize within ECOWAS and
to create regional advocacy bodies. In 2001, NGOs formed the West African Human Rights
Forum, an umbrella organization that gained accreditation from ECOWAS and attempted to
influence Community policymaking.48 These opportunities for regional mobilization provided an avenue in 2004 for human rights groups to contribute to proposals to expand the
Court’s jurisdiction. NGO access was also important five years later when the Gambian government, unhappy with Court’s rulings against it, proposed curbing its newly acquired authority to hear human rights cases.
Another expansion of ECOWAS competence was an important precursor for the ECOWAS
Court’s transformation. In 2001, the member states adopted a Protocol on Democracy and
Good Governance (2001 Good Governance Protocol) to deter military coups and unconstitutional changes of government.49 The Protocol wove multiple references to human rights into
the fabric of an ambitious regional effort to promote democracy, accountability, transparency,
and the rule of law.50 It also included a clause promising that the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS
Court “shall be reviewed so as to give the Court the power to hear, inter-alia, cases relating to
violations of human rights, after all attempts to resolve the matter at the national level have
failed.”51 These developments gave human rights advocates a legal foothold when they later
lobbied to give the Court a human rights jurisdiction.
The Decision to Create a Community Court of Justice for Interstate Disputes
We now situate the creation of the ECOWAS Court within these wider regional developments. ECOWAS’s founders envisioned a tribunal to “ensure the observance of law and justice
in the interpretation of the provisions of [the 1975] Treaty” and to “settl[e] such disputes as
may be referred to it” by the member states.52 But the tribunal was never created during the
founding period for two reasons. The first relates to Nigeria’s regional hegemony. ECOWAS
47
Decision A/DEC.9/8/94 Establishing Regulations for the Grant to Non-governmental Organisations
(NGOs) the Status of Observer Within the Institutions of the Community, Aug. 6, 1994, discussed in KUFUOR,
supra note 12, at 49 –50.
48
Telephone interview with Human Rights Advocate B (Feb. 3, 2011).
49
Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating
to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Dec. 21, 2001
[hereinafter 2001 Good Governance Protocol], at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/en/protocoles/Protocol
%20on%20good-governance-and-democracy-rev-5EN.pdf. For a recent assessment, see Frederick Cowell, The
Impact of the ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy, 19 AFR. J. INT’L AND COMP. L. 331 (2011).
50
See Solomon T. Ebobrah, Legitimacy and Feasibility of Human Rights Realisation Through Regional
Economic Communities in Africa: The Case of the Economic Community of West African States 100 – 02 (2009)
(LLD dissertation, University of Pretoria), at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-02102010-085034/
unrestricted/00front.pdf.
51
2001 Good Governance Protocol, supra note 49, Art. 39.
52
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, supra note 11, Arts. 11, 56.

746

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 107:737

institutions have always depended on the largesse of Nigerian oil revenues, and Nigeria was
reluctant to embrace “an organ that could circumscribe its role as the regional hegemon.”53 The
second relates to the weak legal underpinnings for a Community court. ECOWAS protocols
did not have direct effect in national law,54 and as noted above, most were rarely implemented.
In an environment in which member states neither implemented nor complied with Community rules, a supranational tribunal would have been “largely redundant.”55
The decision to create the ECOWAS Court was part of the broader recommitment to
regional integration in the early 1990s.56 As governments prepared to relaunch the Community, national interior ministers submitted to the member states a proposal to create a court.
The ministers wanted a court to resolve disputes relating to key ECOWAS instruments and programs, including the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment,57
the Trade Liberalisation Scheme, the Agricultural Cooperation Programme, and the Protocol
on Community Enterprises.58 The renewed governmental support for a court in the early
1990s reflected a growing sense that deeper regional integration required a judicial body to
resolve disputes and interpret legal rules.59
A 1991 Community protocol (1991 Protocol) created an international court to carry out
these tasks.60 The Protocol authorized the ECOWAS Court to adjudicate two types of cases
relating to “the interpretation and application” of ECOWAS legal instruments: (1) “disputes
referred . . . by Member States or the Authority, when such disputes arise between the Member
States or between one or more Member States and the Institutions of the Community,” and
(2) proceedings instituted by a member state “on behalf of its nationals . . . against another
Member State or Institution of the Community . . . after attempts to settle the dispute amicably have failed.”61
The 1991 Protocol also included what, in retrospect, was a portentous decision: it established the ECOWAS Court as a permanent institution. At the time, member states were uncertain what kind of judicial body the Community needed. Officials in the ECOWAS Legal Affairs
Directorate favored an ad hoc tribunal, which would be less costly and appropriate for the small
number of interstate disputes capable of judicial resolution. Member states, however, were
53

KUFUOR, supra note 12, at 44.
Akinrinsola, supra note 39, at 503.
55
Id. at 504.
56
Final CEP Report, supra note 14, at 19 –21; LADAN, supra note 16, at 2.
57
See supra note 34.
58
Protocol A/P1/11/84 Relating to Community Enterprises, Nov. 23, 1984; see ECOWAS Ministers of Justice
Meet in Lagos, 2 CONTACT MAG., no. 3, 1990, at 15 (on file with authors) (reporting statements by ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary Adelino Queta).
59
Akinrinsola, supra note 39, at 507– 08; Kofi Oteng Kufuor, Securing Compliance with the Judgements of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice, 8 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (1996).
60
Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice, Arts. 3(1), 4(1), July 6, 1991 [hereinafter 1991 Protocol], provided for a court comprising seven independent judges, each of whom served for a five-year term
renewable once. The judges were appointed “by the Authority and selected from a list of persons nominated by
Member States” who had qualifications similar to those associated with other international courts and tribunals.
Id., Art. 3(1), (4).
61
Id., Art. 9(2), (3). The 1991 Protocol also authorized the ECOWAS Court to issue advisory opinions concerning the Treaty “at the request of the Authority, Council, one or more Member States, or the Executive Secretary
and any other institution of the Community.” Id., Art. 10(1).
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more focused on expanding ECOWAS competences and creating new Community institutions. In this heady atmosphere of supranational expansion, “the Authority said, ‘let’s have a
court.’”62
The 1991 Protocol did not, however, include another design feature favored by the supporters of supranational integration—a provision granting private litigants access to the Court. As
part of a review process leading to the restructuring of ECOWAS in the 1993 Treaty, the
Authority appointed a Committee of Eminent Persons, chaired by General Yakubu Gowon of
Nigeria, to assess the shortcomings of the founding period. The committee’s reports to the
Authority stressed the “importance of [private actors and] interest groups in the integration
process,” both in the interests of democratic legitimacy and because “some of the Community
decisions have to be implemented either directly or indirectly” by these actors.63 The committee also endorsed granting individuals, firms, and interest groups access to the Court:
Where, however, a Community citizen alleges a breach or denial of a right conferred on
him by a Community legislation, a Treaty provision or a protocol, it should be possible
for him to seek redress in the national Court or the Community Court of Justice. . . . This
proposal would also require amendment to Article 9 of the [1991] Protocol . . . . Under
the present provisions, nationals do not have a locus standi in the Court of Justice. Member
States have to act on their behalf, and even so, only in cases relating to the interpretation
and application of the provisions of the Treaty, “after attempts to settle the dispute amicably have failed.”64
We do not know why the member states did not act on this proposal. Perhaps it was politically
expedient not to deviate from a design template that the ECOWAS Authority had previously
vetted and approved. Or perhaps the member states, especially Nigeria, did not actually want
a tribunal with design features that would enhance the supranational aspects of ECOWAS or
constrain their freedom of action.65
The delay in establishing the ECOWAS Court as a working court is consistent with the latter
explanation. The 1991 Protocol did not enter into force until November 1996.66 Even then,
the Court existed only on paper. The situation changed in 1999 when Olusegun Obasanjo
assumed the presidency of Nigeria. Obasanjo increased the country’s international profile, in
part by reviving its leadership of the Community.67 With the region’s economic powerhouse
62

Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, in Abuja, Nigeria (Mar. 7, 2011).
Committee of Eminent Persons for the Review of the ECOWAS Treaty, Draft Report 28, ECOWAS Doc.
ECW/CEP/TREV/VI/2 ( June 1992) [hereinafter Draft CEP Report] (on file with authors); Final CEP Report,
supra note 14, at 23–24 (containing a similar statement).
64
Final CEP Report, supra note 14, at 20 –21; Draft CEP Report, supra note 63, at 20. Elsewhere, the final report
suggests that the committee’s recommendation was for private litigants to have direct access to the ECOWAS Court
rather than access via national courts. Final CEP Report, supra note 14, at 8.
65
Several scholars have argued that private access contributes to the effectiveness of international courts. See, e.g.,
Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and
Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 472–76 (2000); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 287–90. Other scholars
have applied this insight to subregional courts in Africa. See, e.g., RICHARD FRIMPONG OPPONG, LEGAL ASPECTS
OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 119 (2011).
66
The Protocol was provisionally effective from the date of its conclusion in 1991, but it did not enter into force
“definitively” until it had been ratified by seven member states. 1991 Protocol, supra note 60, Art. 34.
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E.g., JOHN ILIFFE, OBASANJO, NIGERIA AND THE WORLD 129, 217–24 (2011); J. Shola Omotola, From
Importer to Exporter: The Changing Role of Nigeria in Promoting Democratic Values in Africa, in AFRICAN POLITICS:
BEYOND THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATISATION 31, 39 ( Joelien Pretorius ed., 2008).
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once again favoring integration, ECOWAS institutions—including the Court— became a priority. In December 2000, the member states appointed the first seven judges, who were sworn
into office on January 31, 2001. The judges picked Hansine Donli as the Court’s president.
Donli was a natural choice to lead the Court. As a Nigerian with a network of contacts in the
country, it would be easier for her to arrange for the infrastructure and administrative support
that the judges required.68
Among the Court’s initial tasks was finding courtrooms and offices for the judges, the chief
registrar, and their staffs.69 The judges secured the construction of a new building in Abuja,
paid for by Nigeria. They next began outreach efforts to attract cases.70 According to Donli,
member states were largely unaware of “the need to seek [the Court’s] advice with respect [to]
the different problems they will be facing, arising from interpretation of the Treaty and Protocols.”71 Notwithstanding these outreach efforts, however, the ECOWAS Court remained
idle for nearly three years after opening its doors for business.
II. EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION AND ACCESS RULES OF THE ECOWAS COURT
The member states created the ECOWAS Court to adjudicate interstate economic disputes.
But in the wake of the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, and as human rights NGOs
became more active in regional policymaking—an involvement made possible by the Community’s new openness to civil society—the NGOs saw an opportunity to redeploy an existing
institution to promote their objectives. They focused on a provision in the 2001 Good Governance Protocol that suggested that the not-yet-operational Court might one day hear “cases
relating to violations of human rights, after all attempts to resolve the matter at the national
level have failed.”72 In 2001, such a possibility seemed remote. In this part we explain how
advocates transformed that vague promise into a reality.
The opportunity for change presented itself following the Court’s first decision—Afolabi v.
Nigeria—a case challenging blatant noncompliance with ECOWAS free-movement rules.73
We first review the Court’s dismissal of the case and then explain how ECOWAS judges, civil
society groups, and ECOWAS officials lobbied the member states to expand the Court’s jurisdiction. We then consider how these actors created an international human rights court with
design features different from other human rights tribunals.
68
Interview with judges at the headquarters of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in Abuja, Nigeria
(Mar. 11, 2011); Adelanwa Bamgboye, Nigeria: Some Judges Are Strong Even at 80 —Hansine Donli, DAILY TRUST
(Nigeria) (Sept. 28, 2010), at http://allafrica.com/stories/201009280476.html. Although the news archive at
AllAfrica.com requires a subscription, each of the links to that archive leads to a web page with the first few sentences
of the article, information about its publication, and a link to the full article. All sources cited from AllAfrica.com
are also on file with authors.
69
The ECOWAS Court was initially located in Lagos, Nigeria. It moved to its permanent headquarters in the
capital of Abuja after Nigeria was designated in 2002 as the host country of the Court. Adewale Banjo, The ECOWAS
Court and the Politics of Access to Justice in West Africa, 32 AFR. DEV. 69, 77 (2007).
70
Interview with judges at the headquarters of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, supra note 68; see also
Lillian Okenwa, Law Personality: ‘ECOWAS Court Jurisdiction Will Be Expanded,’ ALLAFRICA.COM (Sept. 21, 2004)
(describing outreach efforts by ECOWAS judges), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200409210061.html.
71
Banjo, supra note 69, at 77.
72
2001 Good Governance Protocol, supra note 49, Art. 39.
73
Afolabi v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/03, Judgment (Apr. 27, 2004), reprinted in 2004 –2009
COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE, ECOWAS LAW REPORT 1 (2011).

2013]

A NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURT FOR WEST AFRICA

749

The Afolabi Case: Justice Denied for Private Litigants
Olajide Afolabi was a Nigerian trader who had entered into a contract to purchase goods in
Benin. Afolabi could not complete the transaction because Nigeria unilaterally closed the border between the two countries. He filed suit with the ECOWAS Court, alleging that the border
closure violated the right to free movement of persons and goods.74
Nigeria challenged the Court’s jurisdiction and Afolabi’s standing, arguing that the 1991
Protocol did not authorize private parties to litigate before the Court. Afolabi countered by
invoking a Protocol provision stating that a “Member State may, on behalf of its nationals,
institute proceedings against another member State.”75 He asserted that the word “may” permits states to raise such cases but does not preclude the Court from receiving complaints from
individuals.76 Afolabi also argued that when a private party sues his own country, that nation
“cannot represent the party because the Member State cannot be both the plaintiff and the
defender.”77 Finally, Afolabi invoked “the principles of equity”78 in the 1991 Protocol to support an expansive interpretation of the Court’s jurisdiction.79
The Court rejected each of these arguments and dismissed the suit. The judges acknowledged that Afolabi’s complaint raised “a serious claim touching on free movement and free
movement of goods,”80 but they reasoned that an ECOWAS legal instrument must expressly
grant the Court jurisdiction. Article 9 of the 1991 Protocol is “plain” and “unambiguous” on
this issue: only states can institute proceedings on behalf of their nationals.81 The Protocol
must therefore be applied as written, even if the result—insulating states against suits by their
own nationals alleging violations of ECOWAS rules—seems “repugnant,” “absurd[],” or
“harsh.”82
The ECOWAS Court also rejected Afolabi’s broad interpretation of the word “equity” in the
1991 Protocol, comparing it to a similar provision in the Treaty Establishing the European
Community.83 According to the Court, “activist[] judges” on the European Court of Justice
had applied this provision to “define the role of the [European] court very broadly,” “to extend
its review on jurisdiction to cover bodies which were not listed in the Treaty,” and “to fill in
gaps in treaties.”84 The ECOWAS judges candidly declared that, because “some of the [ECJ’s]
decisions [have] attracted criticisms,” “[w]e . . . do not want to tow on the same line.”85
The Afolabi case was a paradigmatic illustration of the serious physical and legal barriers confronting the region’s importers and exporters. Like the ECJ before it, the ECOWAS Court
74

Afolabi invoked this right as guaranteed in the 1993 Treaty, supra note 37, Protocol A/P.1/5/79 (free movement), supra note 34, and the African Charter, supra note 7. Id., para. 7.
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1991 Protocol, supra note 60, Art. 9(3) (emphasis added).
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could have adopted a purposive interpretation of Community economic rules to enable private
traders to challenge those barriers. Instead, the judges responded with restraint. They strictly
interpreted the 1991 Protocol and concluded that only ECOWAS member states could authorize the Court to review complaints from private actors.
The Coordinated Campaign by Nonstate Actors to Redesign the ECOWAS Court, and the
Surprising Absence of Member State Opposition
The dismissal of the Afolabi suit exposed a basic flaw in the Court’s architecture: governments had little incentive to challenge barriers to regional integration, and private traders
had no judicial mechanism for doing so. Responding to this flaw, ECOWAS judges, NGOs,
and Community officials launched a campaign to expand the Court’s jurisdiction. The campaign succeeded, but the institutional reforms did not address the unsatisfactory outcome in
Afolabi. Instead, the changes gave the ECOWAS Court a capacious human rights mandate.
In this section, we describe the coordinated campaign by ECOWAS judges, NGOs, and
Community officials to lobby for giving the Court jurisdiction over human rights cases. We
also explore the surprising lack of member state opposition to the campaign. In part IV, we
return to these events to explain why court reform omitted private litigant access in economic
cases.
ECOWAS judges had long recognized the problems that the Afolabi case illustrated. As one
judge explained in an interview: “Individuals started to come and asked us if they had access
to the Court. They were surprised because ECOWAS has Protocols that affected them—such
as free movement of people and goods—and they didn’t understand how the Protocols were
supposed to be effective.” The judges were discussing how to address the situation when
Afolabi filed his complaint in October 2003. The case’s sympathetic facts “assisted us in making a proposal” to expand the Court’s jurisdiction, relying on a clause in the 1991 Protocol that
invites such proposals.86
In contrast to the narrow, formalist analysis of the Afolabi decision, the judges raised expansive policy arguments outside the courtroom to lobby for an overhaul of the 1991 Protocol.
On the same day that the Court released the Afolabi judgment, it also issued a press release
urging governments “to enable individuals to bring actions before the court as there are cases
member states cannot bring on behalf of [their] nationals.”87 The Court also published a booklet that summarized the legal arguments of parties in Afolabi and the judgment dismissing the
suit. The judges distributed the booklet widely to show that they had finally issued a decision
and to highlight the flaws in the ECOWAS legal system.88 During the next several months, in
meetings with lawyers, civil society groups, and government officials, and in statements to the
86

Interview with judges at the headquarters of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, supra note 68;
1991 Protocol, supra note 60, Art. 33(1) (providing that “the President of the Court may . . . submit proposals for
amendments of this Protocol”).
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Lillian Okenwa, ECOWAS Court Not Open to Individual Litigants, THIS DAY (Nigeria) (Apr. 28, 2004) (on file
with authors); see also ECOWAS Throws Out Suit Against Nigeria over Land Border Closure with Benin, VANGUARD
(Nigeria) (Apr. 28, 2004), 2004 WLNR 7109799.
88
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news media,89 the judges continued to publicize the need to provide access for private litigants.90
Regional bar associations and human rights groups joined the judges’ campaign. The focus
on human rights issues in ECOWAS—which, as part I explained, began with the abuses linked
to ECOMOG’s humanitarian interventions— expanded during the ensuing decade as civil
society groups capitalized on the shift to more democratic governments, the rebranding of
ECOWAS as a “people-centered” institution, and the enhanced access rules for transnational
NGOs.91
Shortly after the Court dismissed the Afolabi case, human rights groups seized the opportunity for court reform.92 Leaders of the West African Bar Association met with ECOWAS
judges and staff to press the case for “a Court that could address human rights issues.”93
With the judges’ support, bar association attorneys consulted with other NGOs and
ECOWAS officials to develop a proposal to revise the Court’s jurisdiction. The key stakeholders met in Dakar, Senegal, in October 2004 at a consultative forum organized by the
Open Society Initiative for West Africa.94 The forum issued a declaration calling for the
89
E.g., Lillian Okenwa, Broaden ECOWAS Court’s Jurisdiction, THIS DAY (Nigeria) (Sept. 2, 2004), at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200409020666.html; Justice Aminata Malle Sanogo, Practice and Procedure in
ECOWAS Court, paper presented at the 2007 Annual General Conference of the Nigerian Bar Association at Ilorin,
Kwara State, Nigeria (Aug. 26 –31, 2007), quoted in A. O. Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS Community Court
Protocol and the Constitutions of Member States, 12 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 111, 117 (2010).
90
The judges appear to have favored giving private litigants access to the Court in both economic and human
rights cases:

[T]he right of access to the Court is the keystone in the development of the Community law. The promotion
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Community Citizens cannot be ensured, if right
of direct access to the Community Court of Justice is not guaranteed. A cardinal objective of ECOWAS is the
formation of an economic union and a common market. . . . [T]his scheme and the intended benefits cannot
be realized, unless individuals, consumers, manufacturers and corporate bodies that are the prime movers in
commercial transactions have direct access to the Court of Justice.
ECOWAS: Court Procedure and the Application of Protocols 10 –12 (n.d.), at http://www.crin.org/docs/ecowas

procedure.doc. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Court prepared this document. Specifically, in press interviews ECOWAS judges echoed similar themes. See, e.g., Lillian Okenwa, ECOWAS Court: Individuals to Have Access,
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urgent adoption of a protocol to give individuals direct access to the Court in human rights
cases.95
At this stage, officials in the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat became key players. The secretariat had long supported making ECOWAS more relevant to civil society and adding a
human rights mandate to Community legal texts and institutions.96 Its officials were also frustrated by the Court’s budgetary needs. The Court is a permanent judicial body. But with no
cases on its docket, the Court was, in the words of one official, a “huge body with nothing to
do.”97 The secretariat wanted to give the judges and staff enough work to justify the large
expenditure of Community resources.98
The secretariat’s backing greatly increased the likelihood that the member states would
approve the protocol advocated by ECOWAS judges and NGOs. We asked officials in the
Legal Affairs Directorate how national political leaders viewed the court reform proposal.
“They trusted us” was the response:
When we draft [legal] texts, we consult a lot. We write memoranda that explain why we
are making the proposal. We exchange views with the member states. Member states comment on the draft proposals before we convey any draft legislation. We incorporate all of
this input before the actual meeting where the proposal is discussed.99
Notwithstanding the ECOWAS secretariat’s support for the proposal, the absence of government opposition to giving the Court a human rights mandate is striking. We queried
numerous stakeholders to probe for such opposition. They all responded that the proposal was
approved without much controversy. By all appearances, that is accurate. We found no evidence that individual countries, or member states collectively, attempted to block, stall, or narrow the protocol. Nonetheless, civil society groups recognized that they needed to “mobilize”
to secure the protocol’s adoption—in particular, by soliciting the support of sympathetic
governments.100 They met with the president of Senegal (the only nation in West Africa
never ruled by a military dictatorship), arguing that a human rights court was “especially
needed for countries whose legal and judicial systems are weak.”101 The president agreed to
support the protocol at the next meeting of the ECOWAS Authority. The NGOs also consulted
officials from the justice and integration ministries in several countries, and conferred with
the staff of the ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate, which was preparing the final draft of the
protocol.102
Barely nine months after the dismissal of the Afolabi case, the coordinated court reform campaign reached a successful conclusion. On January 19, 2005, the member states adopted the
95
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2005 Protocol by consensus and with immediate provisional effect.103 The Protocol markedly
expands the ECOWAS Court’s authority, most notably by giving the Court a capacious human
rights mandate.
The Distinctive Features of the ECOWAS Court’s Human Rights Jurisdiction
The 2005 Protocol’s most important clauses appear in two short sentences in articles redefining the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction and access rules. Article 3 revises Article 9 of the 1991
Protocol and lists each ground of jurisdiction. The fourth paragraph states: “The Court has
jurisdiction to determine case[s] of violation of human rights that occur in any Member
State.”104 Article 4, which adds a new Article 10 to the 1991 Protocol, identifies the litigants
who have access to the ECOWAS Court. It includes a subparagraph authorizing the Court to
receive complaints from “individuals on application for relief for violation of their human
rights.”105 On first impression, these simple provisions appear straightforward. In reality, they
mask three design features that collectively gave the ECOWAS Court much broader authority
than other human rights tribunals.
Direct access for private litigants. First, the ECOWAS Court is unusual for a new human rights
court in granting direct access to private litigants. For the vast majority of cases in the African
and American human rights systems (and in the European system prior to 1998), complainants
must first submit their allegations to a quasi-judicial commission that screens complaints and
issues nonbinding recommendations for those petitions that it deems admissible. Review by
a court with the power to issue a legally binding judgment occurs only if a state has voluntarily
accepted the court’s jurisdiction and if the commission or the state refers the case for a judicial
resolution.106
This tiered review structure—a commission to vet complaints, optional jurisdiction, and
limiting the actors who can refer cases to a court—provides states with multiple layers of political protection. In the African Charter system, for example, private litigants have direct access
to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights only if the respondent state has ratified
the protocol establishing the Court and filed a separate optional declaration allowing private
litigants to submit such complaints. To date, only seven of fifty-four African nations—four of
them ECOWAS member states— have filed such declarations.107
The ECOWAS Court lacks any of these political buffers. ECOWAS judges have repeatedly
affirmed that private litigants “have direct access to . . . the Court when their human rights are
103
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upon signature by the Heads of State and Government” and “shall definitively enter into force upon the ratification
by at least nine (9) signatory States”).
104
Id., Art. 3 (revising Art. 9(4) of the 1991 Protocol).
105
Id., Art. 4 (inserting Art. 10(d) into the 1991 Protocol). Article 10(d) also provides that applications alleging
human rights violations may not be anonymous and many not be made while the same matter is pending before
another international court.
106
Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AJIL 783, 791– 801 (2006).
107
Only twenty-six of fifty-four African Charter member states have ratified the African Court Protocol.
Seven of these twenty-six states—Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, and Tanzania—
have filed separate optional declarations giving private litigants direct access the Africa Court. See Côte d’Ivoire
Deposits the Declaration Allowing Individuals Direct Access ( July 31, 2013), at http://www.african-court.org/
en/index.php/news/latest-news/426-the-republic-of-cote-d-ivoire-deposits-the-declaration-allowing-individualsand-ngos-direct-access-to-the-african-court.
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violated.”108 The judges have extended access not only to individuals—who are expressly
mentioned in the 2005 Protocol— but to NGOs.109 They have also rejected attempts by
governments to circumvent the direct access provision, rebuffing arguments that human
rights are matters essentially within a state’s domestic jurisdiction, that ECOWAS treaties
and protocols have no domestic effect, and that direct access for NGOs should be denied
because litigants have no standing to challenge human rights violations before national
courts.110
An indeterminate human rights jurisdiction. A second distinctive feature of the Court’s design
is that no ECOWAS legal instrument prescribes which human rights its judges can adjudicate.
The primary role of the European, Inter-American, and African courts is to interpret and apply
their respective regional human rights charters.111 Their association with these instruments
provides a sanctioned source of law and legal authority for their judges. By contrast, ECOWAS
judges have no designated human rights charter to apply. By declining to designate a prescribed
catalogue of rights, the 2005 Protocol avoided provoking political controversy over which
rights the ECOWAS Court could review. The absence such of an enumerated list, however, also
presented risks for the Court—namely, that its new human rights jurisdiction could be challenged as an overbroad delegation to interpret expansively this rapidly evolving area of international law. As we later explain, the Court is also open to the charge that it applies human
rights instruments that are not legally binding.112
ECOWAS judges have viewed the lack of designated human rights norms as an “opportunity
to define and delimit the scope and legal parameters of its human rights mandate in its own
image.”113 The Court has underscored the primacy of the African human rights system, noting
that all ECOWAS member states are parties to the African Charter, which is also referenced in
108

Tidjani v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/06, Judgment, para. 22 ( July 28, 2007).
E.g., Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09, Ruling, paras. 59 – 61 (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter SERAP Niger Delta Ruling]; Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08, Ruling, paras. 33–34 (Oct. 27, 2009), [hereinafter
SERAP Basic Education Ruling]. By contrast, the Court has held that “no corporate body can bring a human rights
case before this court as a plaintiff as an alleged victim of human rights abuse.” Starcrest Investment Ltd. v. Nigeria,
Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/08, Judgment, para. 17 ( July 8, 2011).
110
E.g., SERAP Basic Education Ruling, supra note 109, paras. 18 –20; Saidykhan v. The Gambia, Case
No. ECW/CCJ/APP/11/07, Ruling, para. 39 ( June 30, 2009).
111
Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 301 (1999). For example,
the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights “relates mainly to the application of the
[American Convention on Human Rights], but has also been extended to a few other regional human rights treaties.” Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 101, 102 (2008). The Court’s advisory jurisdiction is wider, extending to the interpretation
of other human rights treaties ratified by Organization of American States member states. Id. at 102 & n.2. The
jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is broader still. It applies principally to the African
Charter but also extends to “other relevant Human Rights instrument[s] ratified by the States concerned” (contentious jurisdiction) and “any other relevant human rights instruments” (advisory jurisdiction). Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights, Arts. 3, 4, June 10, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (entered into force Jan. 25,
2004).
112
See Ebobrah, supra note 9, at 93; Solomon T. Ebobrah, Critical Issues in the Human Rights Mandate of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice, 54 J. AFR. L. 1, 3–7 (2010) [hereinafter Ebobrah, Critical Issues].
113
Tony Anene-Maidoh, The Mandate of a Regional Court: Experiences from ECOWAS Court of Justice, paper
presented at the Regional Colloquium on the SADC Tribunal, Johannesburg (Mar. 12–13, 2013) (statement by
ECOWAS Court chief registrar).
109
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the 1993 Treaty.114 But ECOWAS judges also regularly apply the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and UN human rights conventions that member states have ratified,115 including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,116 the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,117 and the UN Convention Against Torture.118
The ECOWAS Court also considers a broad array of other sources when interpreting human rights norms. The Court draws inspiration from the 1991 Protocol’s directive to “apply,
as necessary, the body of laws as contained in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice,”119 which, in turn, specifies that treaties, custom, and general principles of law, as
well as national judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified publicists, are all sources
of international law.120 The Court has relied on this provision to consult a wide array of binding
and hortatory international human rights instruments and national laws.121 In Hadijatou
Mani Kouraou v. Niger, for example, the judges cited a multiplicity of sources in reaffirming
the peremptory norm against slavery, and they endorsed the definition of modern forms of
slavery adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.122
No requirement to first exhaust domestic remedies. The ECOWAS Court’s ability to hear
human rights cases is aided by the absence of a requirement to exhaust local remedies. In all
other regional and UN human rights petition systems, individuals must first seek relief in
national courts, administrative agencies, or other domestic venues.123 If a petitioner does not
exhaust such remedies— or explain why they are unavailable, ineffective, or insufficient—the
international tribunal will dismiss her complaint.124
114
E.g., Alade v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/11, Judgment, para. 24 ( June 11, 2012); Keita v. Mali,
Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/06, Judgment, para. 34 (Mar. 22, 2007).
115
E.g., Alade v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 114, para. 25 (asserting the authority to interpret “UN Conventions . . . acceded to by Member States of ECOWAS”).
116
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
117
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 3.
118
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 UNTS 113.
119
1991 Protocol, supra note 60, Art. 19.
120
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38.
121
E.g., David v. Uwechue, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/04/09, Ruling, para. 41 ( June 11, 2010) (“As an international court with jurisdiction over human rights violation[s,] the court cannot disregard the basic principles as
well as the practice that guide the adjudication of the disputes on human rights at the international level.”).
122
Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/07, Judgment, paras. 74 –75, 77
(Oct. 27, 2008), unofficial translation available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/496b41fa2.pdf.
123
“The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a wellestablished rule of customary international law[.]” Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 ICJ REP. 6, 27 (Mar. 21).
Some international agreements—most notably, bilateral investment treaties—intentionally omit an exhaustion
requirement. E.g., George K. Foster, Striking a Balance Between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: The
Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 201 (2011). For human
rights treaties, however, exhaustion is ubiquitous. For example, the African Commission “can only deal with a matter submitted to it after making sure that all local remedies, if they exist, have been exhausted, unless it is obvious
to the Commission that the procedure of achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged.” African Charter,
supra note 7, Art. 50; see also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights
Treaty Bodies—Individual Communications, Procedure for Complaints by Individuals Under the Human Rights
Treaties, at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/individual.htm.
124
According to the African Commission, “A remedy is considered available if the petitioner can pursue it without impediment; it is deemed effective if it offers a prospect of success, and it is found sufficient if it is capable of
redressing the complaint.” Dawda Jawara v. The Gambia, Comm. Nos. 147/95 & 149/96, para. 31, AFR. COMM’N
ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., 13 ANN. ACTIVITY REP., Annex V (1999 –2000), at http://www.achpr.
org/files/activity-reports/13/achpr26and27_actrep13_19992000_eng.pdf.
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In the human rights context, an exhaustion requirement acts as a buffer between domestic
and international legal systems. It “reinforces the subsidiary and complementary relationship
of the international system to systems of internal protection,”125 and reflects a belief that
domestic institutions should have “a first shot” at addressing human rights complaints.126 An
exhaustion rule also reduces “forum shopping and unnecessary rivalry between municipal and
international courts,” as well as the risk of conflicting decisions.127 Finally, it prevents international tribunals from being overburdened by a flood of human rights cases.128
Since granting the ECOWAS Court the authority to hear human rights cases, West African
governments have repeatedly asserted that individuals must exhaust domestic remedies before
petitioning the Court in Abuja. The judges have unwaveringly rebuffed these arguments, reasoning that the lack of an exhaustion rule is neither an inadvertent omission nor a flaw in the
Court’s human rights mandate, but a deliberately chosen element of its judicial architecture.129
Just as the judges in the Afolabi case refused to imply jurisdiction over suits by private parties,
they have also held that non-exhaustion “cannot be taken away by implication” but requires
an express amendment of the 2005 Protocol.130 Nor is the doctrine limited to situations where
litigants have bypassed national proceedings. The ECOWAS Court has also decided cases that
were pending before domestic courts,131 leading commentators to warn of potential conflicts
between ECOWAS and national judges.132
A Broad Authority for Human Rights Suits, but a Narrower Mandate for Economic Cases
Why did the member states agree to give the Court such expansive authority to adjudicate
human rights suits? And why did they allow direct access for human rights complaints but not
for suits alleging violations of ECOWAS economic rules?
In our interviews, stakeholders suggested several plausible explanations. First, states appear
to have accepted that the judges, secretariat officials, and civil society groups were acting in
good faith and within the scope of their delegated authority. Participants in the court reform
campaign underscored that their actions were consistent with ECOWAS rules. Community
legal texts expressly authorize the judges to propose changes to the 1991 Protocol. They also
125
Nsongurna Udombana, So Far, So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 97 AJIL 1, 9 (2003).
126
Ebobrah, supra note 9, at 88.
127
A. O. Enabulele, Sailing Against the Tide: Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies and the ECOWAS Community Court
of Justice, 56 J. AFR. L. 268 (2012).
128
Ebobrah, supra note 9, at 92.
129
E.g., Saidykhan v. The Gambia, Ruling, supra note 110, para. 43 (explaining that “the Supplementary Protocol is an example of legislating out of the rule of customary international law regarding the exhaustion of local
remedies”); Hadijatou Mani Kouraou v. Niger, Judgment, supra note 122, para. 45 (rejecting the argument that
the lack of an exhaustion requirement is “a gap that should be filled” by judicial interpretation). Although states are
free to dispense with an exhaustion of local remedies requirement, they have almost never done so for international
human rights courts and review bodies. See supra note 123.
130
Saidykhan v. The Gambia, Ruling, supra note 110, para. 42.
131
E.g., Ayika v. Liberia, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/07/11, Ruling (Dec. 19, 2011); Hadijatou Mani
Kouraou v. Niger, Judgment, supra note 122.
132
Enabulele, supra note 127, at 293–94. The risk of conflict is mitigated by the ECOWAS Court’s repeated assertion that it is not an appellate tribunal and will not generally review challenges to national court decisions. See, e.g.,
Keita v. Mali, Judgment, supra note 114, para. 31; Alade v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 114, paras. 34 –35.
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empower NGOs to participate in discussions in ECOWAS forums. As for the Executive Secretariat, one of its key tasks is drafting protocols to ECOWAS legal instruments.
Second, all stakeholders supported giving the Court something to do. The frustration
with idle judges was a direct, albeit unintended, artifact of the earlier decision to make the
ECOWAS Court a full-time judicial body. The 2005 Protocol put cases on the Court’s docket,
and it gave member states a concrete way to fulfill their promise to make ECOWAS a more
people-centered organization. Moreover, Community legal texts—in particular, the 2001
Good Governance Protocol— had clearly envisioned giving a human rights jurisdiction to the
Court.
Third, human rights NGOs lobbied hard for a human rights jurisdiction and for the
specific design features that we have highlighted. They argued that exhaustion would make
it too difficult for West Africans to access the Court, especially since most countries “had
weak judiciaries” and lacked “any functioning human rights apparatus.”133 They also highlighted frustrations with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ slow review
of complaints and the spotty compliance with its nonbinding recommendations.134 ECOWAS
officials were receptive to the advocates’ concerns. They also recognized that an exhaustion
requirement would do little to remedy the lack of cases on the Court’s docket.135 As for the
lack of enumerated human rights, governments apparently assumed that the references to the
African Charter in the 1993 Treaty would lead the Court to view the Charter as the primary
source of human rights norms in ECOWAS.136
Fourth, observers stressed that the 2005 Protocol—like other ECOWAS protocols— entered into force on a provisional basis.137 Governments may therefore have believed that the
Court’s human rights jurisdiction would be relatively easy to undo if the Court later behaved in ways that encroached on national sovereignty. The same rationale may also explain the protocol’s other design features. For example, ECOWAS officials characterized the
absence of an exhaustion requirement as an “experiment” that could be revisited in the
future.138 As we explain below, however, despite the nominally provisional status of the 2005
Protocol, its acceptance as an ongoing feature of the Court became a political, if not a legal,
fait accompli.
A final issue concerns the more circumscribed jurisdiction and access provisions for
cases unrelated to human rights. The 2005 Protocol authorizes the ECOWAS Court to interpret all Community legal instruments and to determine the “failure by Member States to honor
their obligations” under those instruments.139 Only member states and ECOWAS officials,
133

Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92.
Interview with Academic A, in Abuja, Nigeria, and by telephone (Feb.–Mar. 2011); see also FRANS
VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 297, 487 (2d ed. 2012) (reviewing the
“major impediments to the[] effectiveness and impact” of the African Commission on Human Rights and
describing the Commission’s “weaknesses . . . in providing a credible and timely forum for . . . recourse” to
victims).
135
Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate B, supra note 98.
136
Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92.
137
Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62; Telephone interview with Human Rights
Advocate A, supra note 91; Telephone interview with Human Rights Advocate B, supra note 48; Interview with
ECOWAS Court Official C, in Abuja, Nigeria (Mar. 11, 2011).
138
Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62.
139
2005 Protocol, supra note 103, Art. 3 (revising Article 9(1)(a), (b) & (d) of the 1991 Protocol).
134
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however, can file such suits; individuals cannot.140 The Protocol does permit private actors
to challenge actions or omissions of Community officials,141 and it authorizes national
judges to refer to the Court, either “on [their] own or at the request of any of the parties,” questions concerning the interpretation of ECOWAS legal texts.142 These reforms increase the
Court’s potential role in adjudicating challenges to noncompliance with ECOWAS economic rules. Despite the continuation of barriers to intraregional trade, however, no noncompliance suits have actually been filed by the secretariat or member states, and no national
judges have referred cases to the Court.143 Part IV returns to this issue, delving further into
the puzzle of why the Court’s adjudicatory role in economic disputes remains virtually nonexistent.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE ECOWAS COURT’S HUMAN RIGHTS AUTHORITY
In its eight years of operation as a human rights court, the ECOWAS Court has survived several political controversies and challenges. The first challenge stemmed from the Court’s intervention in a contested Nigerian election—which triggered protests from Nigerian politicians,
judges, and lawyers. A second, more serious threat involved an effort by the Gambia to curtail
the Court’s jurisdiction in response to decisions finding that state responsible for the torture
of journalists. As we explain, the ECOWAS Court emerged from these two events largely
unscathed and arguably strengthened. The third challenge, which is ongoing, focuses on
improving member state compliance with the Court’s judgments.
A Controversial Intervention in a Nigerian Election Dispute and the Creation of the ECOWAS
Judicial Council
When the ECOWAS Court began to hear cases under its new human rights jurisdiction,
some national judges and attorneys expressed concern that the Court would become embroiled
in domestic political disputes. These concerns came to a head in 2005—the first year of the
Court’s new mandate—when the Court’s president issued a controversial ruling in an election
imbroglio involving a seat in the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives.
Jerry Ugokwe had been declared the winner of the election by the Independent National
Electoral Commission. A Nigerian Elections Tribunal reversed the commission, finding that
Ugokwe was ineligible to run for the seat. The Nigerian Federal Appeals Court—the final court
of review for all election disputes in Nigeria— upheld Ugokwe’s disqualification.144 Dissatisfied with this outcome, Ugokwe filed a complaint with the ECOWAS Court alleging a violation
of his right to a fair hearing.145 Ugokwe asked the Court to issue a special interim order to
140

Id., Art. 4 (inserting Article 10(a) & (b) into the 1991 Protocol).
Id. (inserting Article 10(c) into the 1991 Protocol).
142
Id. (inserting Article 10(f) into the 1991 Protocol).
143
Anene-Maidoh, supra note 113, at 9 –10 (stating that the “concept of Preliminary Ruling as practiced by the
[ECJ] is yet to take root in the context of regional integration in Africa”).
144
Lillian Okenwa, Election Petition: ECOWAS Court Stops Ugokwe’s Successor, THIS DAY (Nigeria) ( June 2,
2005), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200506030463.html.
145
Iheanacho Nwosu, West Africa: I Am at ECOWAS Court to Get Fair Hearing—Hon. Ugokwe, DAILY
CHAMPION (Nigeria) ( June 21, 2005), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200506210089.html.
141
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prevent the Nigerian government from invalidating his election victory or from seating his
opponent.146 President Donli issued the interim order barring the legislature from swearing
in Okeke while Ugokwe’s complaint was pending.147 Nigeria promptly sought to dismiss the
suit for lack of jurisdiction, accusing Ugokwe of “forum shopping with courts.”148 President
Donli responded by renewing the interim order prior to leaving for a recess.149 These
were audacious acts, but Donli publicly defended them as necessary, temporary measures to
preserve the existence of a justiciable controversy until the judges could review Ugokwe’s allegations.150
Notwithstanding concerns over the orders’ validity, Nigerian officials complied with the
Court’s interim directive. The attorney general and minister of justice issued a request to the
speaker of the House of Representatives “not to swear [Okeke] in until the case is fully settled
by the [ECOWAS Court].”151 The request created a political uproar that spilled onto the front
pages of the country’s newspapers. Politicians, judges, and lawyers focused on a provision of
the Nigerian Constitution that designates election disputes as exclusively domestic matters.152
They argued that this clause deprived the ECOWAS Court of jurisdiction to hear the election
disputes.153
After returning from a month-long recess, the judges dramatically reversed course and dismissed the suit. They reasoned that “no provision, whether general or specific, gives the Court
powers to adjudicate on electoral issues or matters arising thereof.”154 They also asserted that
the ECOWAS Court “is not a Court of Appeal or a Court of cassation” over domestic courts.
The judges thus declared themselves without authority to intervene “against the execution of
the Judgment already made by the Federal Appeal Court of the Member State of Nigeria.”155
The judges did not explain the about-face from the preliminary order, but the categorical
nature of the decision suggests that they wanted to send a clear message that they would not
intervene in future election disputes.
The Court’s dramatic change of position did little, however, to quell the underlying legal
and political controversy. As one Community official observed, “national high courts were
146
Specifically, Ugokwe requested a “special interim order” enjoining (1) the INEC from (a) invalidating Ugokwe’s election or (b) “tak[ing] any steps” toward his replacement, and (2) the Federal National Assembly from relieving Ugokwe of his seat. Ugokwe v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/02/05, Judgment, paras. 7, 14.2–.3 (Oct. 7,
2005), reprinted in 2004 – 09 COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE, ECOWAS LAW REPORT 37 (2011).
147
Okenwa, supra note 144.
148
FG Asks ECOWAS Court to Dismiss Ugokwe Suit, VANGUARD (Nigeria) ( June 17, 2005), at http://all
africa.com/stories/200506170727.html.
149
Ise-Olu-Oluwa Ige, ECOWAS Court Goes on Recess, VANGUARD (Nigeria) ( July 7, 2005), at http://all
africa.com/stories/200507070032.html.
150
Okenwa, supra note 144.
151
Ugokwe v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 146, para. 10.
152
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Art. 246(3), 1999, at http://www.nigeria-law.org/
ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm#CourtOfAppeal.
153
Ige, supra note 149; Okenwa, supra note 144. The individuals whom we interviewed repeated these arguments. Telephone interview with Academic A ( Jan. 6, 2011); Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra
note 92; Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62; Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs
Directorate B, supra note 98.
154
Ugokwe v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 146, para. 19.
155
Id., paras. 32, 33.
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upset that [ECOWAS] judges with less qualifications and experience than they had could issue
rulings that would be final and binding on them.”156 The Ugokwe case exacerbated these
anxieties by putting the ECOWAS Court in direct conflict with the Nigerian judiciary and
political establishment.
The member states responded to these concerns by creating a new ECOWAS institution that
appears to have enhanced the Court’s independence and authority. In 2006, as part of a wider
overhaul of the Community,157 the member states created a Judicial Council158 “to ensure that
the Court is endowed with the best qualified and competent persons to contribute . . . to the
establishment of Community laws capable of consolidating and accelerating the regional integration process.”159 The council comprises the chief justices from member states not then represented on the seven-member Court.160
The Judicial Council increases the influence of national judges in the selection process
for the ECOWAS Court, and it creates misconduct review procedures that insulate judges
from attempts by governments to remove them from office. ECOWAS judges are “statutory
appointments”— high-level positions that rotate among the member states. West African
governments collectively decide which country is next in line for a statutory appointment
to the Court. The Legal Affairs Directorate then advertises for the position and collects
submissions from eligible applicants. Applications that meet specified criteria are forwarded
to the Judicial Council, which vets applications and interviews candidates. The council
then selects three candidates and forwards their names, together with point-based rankings, to
the ECOWAS Authority, which decides which candidate to appoint to the Court. For sitting
judges, the Council is tasked with reviewing complaints alleging judicial bias and other forms
of malfeasance, providing a layer of political insulation for ECOWAS judges against whom such
charges are filed.161
Also included in the Judicial Council reforms was a revision of the tenure of ECOWAS
judges—from a five-year term with the possibility of one reappointment to a single, nonrenewable four-year term.162 Secretariat officials explained this reform as a way to bring judicial
appointments to the Court in line with other statutory appointments in the Community.
Although the shortening of terms may seem like a rebuke of the ECOWAS Court, no one we
interviewed characterized the change in this way. Rather, they noted that shorter, nonrenew156
Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62; see also Donald Andoor,
Nigeria: Ugokwe Loses House Seat, THIS DAY (Nigeria) (Sept. 22, 2005), at http://allafrica.com/stories/
200509230288.html.
157
ECOWAS NEWSLETTER, no. 1, Oct. 2006 (describing institutional changes), at http://www.ecowas.int/
publications/en/newsletter/ECOWAS_NewsLetter_01-Eng.pdf.
158
Decision A/Dec.2/06/06 Establishing the Judicial Council of the Community (adopted June 14, 2006) (on
file with authors).
159
ECOWAS NEWSLETTER, supra note 157, at 4.
160
Decision A/Dec.2/06/06, supra note 158, Arts. 1, 2.
161
Regulation C/Reg.23/12/07, Adopting the Rules of Procedure of the Community–Judicial Council, Art. 5,
Dec. 14 –15, 2007 (on file with authors). The dismissal of judges for politically unpopular rulings has been a significant concern in the East African Community legal system. James T. Gathii, Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice’s Human Rights Strategy, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 24 –25) (on file with authors).
162
This reform amends Article 4 of the 1991 Protocol. See ECOWAS NEWSLETTER, supra note 157, at 4.
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able terms would increase the opportunity of all ECOWAS member states to appoint judges to
the Court.163
The Judicial Council and tenure reforms have been favorably received by stakeholders.
As one lawyer noted, “Now that the Judicial Council exists, the stature of the Court will be
higher, which will improve the quality of judges [since] more qualified candidates will
apply.”164 The process is still relatively new, however, and only one set of appointments has
been made using the new procedures: in 2008, the ECOWAS Authority approved the slate of
judges recommended by the council.165 In addition, some concerns over judicial qualifications
persist—in particular, the absence of a requirement that judges be well versed in international
human rights law.166
The Gambia’s Proposal to Restrict the ECOWAS Court’s Human Rights Jurisdiction
The next political flashpoint for the ECOWAS Court concerned two decisions against
the Gambia— both finding that state responsible for the disappearance and torture of journalists—that were widely viewed as legally sound, albeit politically audacious. Unable to challenge
the judgments as poorly reasoned or as an improper interference with domestic authority,
the Gambia launched a campaign in 2009 to narrow the Court’s human rights jurisdiction.
The case of Chief Ebrima Manneh involved a reporter for the Daily Observer who disclosed
information that appeared in a news article critical of the government.167 Plainclothes intelligence agents arrested Manneh in July 2006. He disappeared until January 2007, when reports
emerged that he was being detained at a local police station. Intelligence and police officials
denied that he was in their custody.168 In May 2007, the NGO Media Foundation for West
Africa filed a complaint with the ECOWAS Court charging the Gambia with numerous human
rights abuses, demanding Manneh’s release, and requesting compensation for his injuries.169
The Gambia refused to respond to the complaint and ignored multiple requests to appear or
163
Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate A, supra note 62. Other studies have found that international judges who are ineligible for reappointment are more likely to rule against the governments that appointed
them. Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights,
102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 427 (2008).
164
Interview with Human Rights Advocate C, supra note 92.
165
African Press Organization, ECOWAS Council of Ministers Seeks Regional Infrastructural Development
(Nov. 30, 2008) (reporting results of a 2008 meeting of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers at which the “Council
. . . endorsed the report of the ECOWAS Judicial Council on the appointment of three new judges” for the
Court), at http://appablog.wordpress.com/2008/11/30/burkina-faso-ecowas-council-of-ministers-seeks-regionalinfrastructural-development/; Interview with ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate B, supra note 98.
166
Solomon T. Ebobrah, A Critical Analysis of the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Community Court of
Justice 47 n.194 (2008) (noting statement by ECOWAS Court vice president that “the human rights competence
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as a criterion for appointment), at http://www.humanrights.dk/files/doc/forskning/Research%20partnership%20
programme%20publications/S.Ebobrah.pdf.
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file documents, delaying the proceedings.170 In June 2008, the Court ruled for Manneh, ordering the Gambia to release him from “unlawful detention without any further delay,” pay him
U.S.$100,000 in damages, and bear the costs of the litigation.171
The Gambia ignored the judgment—a decision that received a great deal of unfavorable
publicity from governments, international organizations, and NGOs.172 For example, the
International Press Institute publicly stated that the “Gambian media environment has long
been hostile and dangerous, but the government’s flagrant disregard for the ECOWAS legal
proceedings represents a low point.”173 Likewise, the African Commission on Human Rights
called on the Gambia “to immediately and fully comply” with the ECOWAS Court’s judgment.174
The second case, concerning the detention and torture of Musa Saidykhan, was harder for
the government to ignore, because the plaintiff was alive, exhibited clear evidence of torture,
and pursued the case from the safety of another country.175 After a coup attempt in 2006, the
Independent newspaper published the names of individuals that the Gambian National Intelligence Agency had arrested. Shortly thereafter and without a warrant, soldiers and policemen
arrested Saidykhan, the newspaper’s editor.176 Security agents took Saidykhan to a detention
center, where he was held for twenty-two days and repeatedly tortured.177 Intelligence officials
eventually released Saidykhan, but they continued to monitor his movements and threatened
his family, ultimately causing Saidykhan and his family to flee the country.178
In 2007, Saidykhan, supported by the Media Foundation for West Africa, filed a complaint
with the ECOWAS Court seeking a declaration that his arrest and detention were illegal and
that he had been tortured and denied a fair hearing.179 This time, the Gambia participated in
the proceedings. It asked the ECOWAS Court to dismiss the suit on the grounds that the Court
lacked jurisdiction, that the Court’s intervention was “an affront to [its] sovereignty,” and that
the suit should be heard by a national court.180 In 2009, the Court issued an interim ruling
rejecting these arguments.181
The Gambia’s political attack on the ECOWAS Court occurred while the merits phase of
Saidykhan was pending. Gambian officials noted that the government was “aggrieved” by the
170
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judgment in the Manneh case and had “set the political process in motion to take the matter
to the next level and get the decision set aside.”182 In September 2009, the Gambia called for
a Meeting of Government Experts to revise the 2005 Protocol and restrict the Court’s authority.183 Most importantly, the Gambia sought to limit the ECOWAS Court’s human rights jurisdiction to treaties ratified by the respondent state and to require exhaustion of domestic
remedies.184
On their face, these proposals seem uncontroversial. As noted above, other international
human rights tribunals operate under similar limitations. According to a consortium of
NGOs, however, the “Gambian government propose[d] these amendments so that the Court
will be weakened in its capacity to deal effectively with tyrannical governments trampling on
citizens’ rights.” In the NGOs’ view, the proposal to require exhaustion of local remedies aimed
to “depriv[e] citizens of free access” to an “independent judicial instrument that is not usually
available in many countries” in a region “where the judiciary is an arm of the executive.” And
the attempt to limit the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction to ratified human rights treaties was a
ploy “to prevent the Court from adjudicating on the [Saidykhan] case against The Gambia”—
“one of the rare African countries which has not ratified” the UN Convention Against Torture.185
The ECOWAS Commission (which, under the 2006 reorganization mentioned above,
replaced the Executive Secretariat) responded to the Gambian proposals by invoking the procedures for public participation in ECOWAS decision making. The commission also invited
West African lawyers to consider the proposed, multipart amendment.186 Based on their input,
the ECOWAS Committee of Legal Experts recommended against narrowing the Court’s
human rights jurisdiction. In October 2009, the Council of Justice Ministers unanimously
endorsed the committee’s recommendation—with the consequence that the proposals were
implicitly rejected at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers the following month.187
The Gambia’s proposals provided a clear opportunity for ECOWAS member states to reconsider the 2005 Protocol. Their decision to reject the Gambian challenge is striking. In our interviews, officials offered different explanations for this decision. One source explained that governments did not want to reward the Gambia for its poor human rights record. These
182
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governments recognized that Gambian officials were acting in a blatantly “self-interested way”
by attempting to circumvent the Court’s review of serious and widely known human rights
abuses.188 Also important were the mobilization efforts of human rights NGOs and attorneys,
who made sure that the issues were well covered in the press. One interviewee even suggested
that ECOWAS officials had a hand in opposing the Gambian proposals by leaking information
to human rights lawyers.189
In December 2010, the ECOWAS Court issued a judgment holding the Gambia responsible for the illegal detention and torture of Saidykhan and ordering the state to pay him
U.S.$200,000 in damages.190 The Gambia has refused to comply, however, with either the
Saidykhan or the Manneh judgments. In 2011, in addition to denying responsibility for
Manneh’s death,191 the Gambia asked the Court to set aside both judgments, and attacked
Saidykhan as a “miscarriage of justice since the court failed to properly appraise the evidence
on record.” The Media Foundation for West Africa opposed the application and reiterated
its demands for compliance.192 In 2012, the judges rejected the Gambia’s arguments and reaffirmed the two judgments and remedial orders.193
Although the Gambia continues to resist the ECOWAS Court’s authority, the defeat of its
judicial reform campaign has had the opposite of its intended effect: it has bolstered the Court’s
legitimacy. As previously explained, the 2005 Protocol entered into force provisionally pending ratification by individual member states, a process that is still ongoing. In 2006, however,
West African governments restructured ECOWAS rulemaking to increase its supranational
character. The reforms authorize the Authority to adopt “supplementary acts.” These legal
instruments are equivalent to protocols but with one crucial difference—they are “binding on
Member States and the institutions of the Community” without the need for country-bycountry ratification.194
The effect of these reforms on previously adopted protocols is unclear. One attorney worried
that the continuation of the 2005 Protocol’s provisional status remains a potential “liability”
for the ECOWAS Court.195 Even if this interpretation is correct as a legal matter, those whom
188
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we interviewed all agreed that the rejection of the Gambia’s proposals made the Protocol’s provisional status a non-issue politically.196 Having survived this attempt to curb its jurisdiction,
the Court’s human rights authority now rests on a more solid foundation than when the member states first gave the Court that authority in 2005.
Strategies to Promote Compliance: Strict Proof Requirements, Limited Remedies, and Public
Outreach
Since the expansion of its jurisdiction in 2005, the ECOWAS Court has issued nearly seventy
merits judgments, the large majority of which concern human rights.197 Many of these decisions are legally and politically consequential. In a well-publicized early case, ECOWAS judges
found Niger liable for condoning a customary practice of female slavery.198 More recently,
the Court issued a pathbreaking judgment against Nigeria for failing to regulate multinational
oil companies that polluted the Niger Delta.199 Other high-profile decisions have barred the
domestic prosecution of former Chadian president Hissein Habré as contrary to the nonretroactivity of criminal law;200 ordered the restoration of funds embezzled from a program to
provide free basic education to children;201 granted NGOs standing to challenge violations of
economic and social rights;202 and awarded damages to individuals arbitrarily detained by
police and security officials.203
These decisions grab headlines, and they significantly enhance the Court’s salience and visibility across West Africa.204 It is less clear, however, whether these decisions have improved
respect for human rights in the region.205 According to a 2013 paper by the Court’s chief reg196
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istrar, “not many decisions of the Court have been enforced.”206 Perhaps aware of the challenges of inducing governments to comply with its judgments, the Court has tempered the
legal and political impact of its decisions by requiring applicants to provide persuasive proof
that the relevant human rights norms are widely accepted and by limiting the remedies that it
demands of governments.
Complainants have raised a wide array of legal issues before the ECOWAS Court. Some allegations relate to human rights only tangentially; others seek expansive interpretations of established rights; still others allege multiple violations but offer few supporting facts. The Court
has responded to these diverse complaints by adopting fairly strict pleading and proof requirements. Applicants must “specify the particular human right which has been violated”207 and
provide evidence that is “sufficiently convincing and unequivocal.”208 ECOWAS judges have
also rejected litigants’ attempts to assert human rights claims against individuals, corporations,
and subnational political bodies209—issues that have also been litigated in the United States.210
The judges’ circumspection with regard to remedies is also noteworthy. In the modern forms
of slavery case, for example, the Court ordered Niger to pay the equivalent of U.S.$20,000 to
a woman who had been enslaved.211 The government paid the damages within three months,
and, while not formally required to do so, prosecuted her former master.212 Yet the Court made
compliance fairly easy for Niger by refusing the applicant’s entreaties to find fault with the laws,
practices, and customs that gave rise to the modern slavery violations in the first instance.213
Other high-profile decisions exhibit similar remedial caution. In the Nigerian education
case, the ECOWAS Court declared that “every Nigerian child is entitled to free and compulsory
basic education.”214 Yet it did not order the government to allocate whatever funds were
required to educate all primary school age children. Instead, based on evidence that specific
funds had been embezzled from the national education program, the Court ordered Nigeria
to “take the necessary steps to provide the money to cover the shortfall” while the government
pursued efforts “to recover the funds or prosecute the suspects.”215
by the political arms of [the Community], the indulgence of national executives or the goodwill of national courts.”
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The judges took a different tack in a judgment touching the “third rail” of Nigerian politics—the activities of multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta. The Court declared that
Nigeria was responsible for failing to regulate companies that had despoiled the area. It rejected
a demand, however, for U.S.$1 billion in damages on the ground that the applicants had not
identified particular victims and that awarding mass damages would be impractical “in terms
of justice, morality and equity.”216 The judges instead ordered Nigeria to “take all measures”
to restore the environment, prevent future damage, and hold the perpetrators accountable—
without, however, specifying how the government was to achieve these goals.217
Strict proof requirements and limited remedies may be strategically wise choices for a
young human rights court whose judgments have yet to elicit widespread compliance. A
2012 NGO report supports this conclusion. In addition to full compliance in the Hadijatou
Mani Koraou slavery case against Niger, the report lists a few instances of partial compliance,218 including the Habré decision against Senegal, the release of the former president
of Niger from house arrest, and the payment of damages to members of the Togolese Parliament wrongfully removed from office.219 Other judgments, including the high-profile decisions against Nigeria and the Gambia discussed above, have yet to garner even partial compliance.220
ECOWAS judges readily admit these compliance challenges. In 2012, the current ECOWAS
Court president, Awa Nana Daboya, publicly “decried the attitude of the Nigerian government for not honoring any of” the ten merits judgments that the Court had issued against that
country.221 At the same time, the Court has praised those countries—including Nigeria—that
have designated a public ministry to oversee the implementation of its judgments. And it has
discussed ways to promote compliance in meetings with government officials and national
judges.222 Civil society groups have added their voices to these efforts, issuing public declarations demanding that states comply with ECOWAS Court decisions and urging Community
officials to step up enforcement efforts.223 A few political leaders have also expressed support
216
217
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for compliance in specific cases, even when the government as a whole remains noncommittal.224
Pressure for compliance also comes from outside ECOWAS. For example, the disappearance
of Chief Ebrima Manneh, the applicant in the 2008 unlawful detention case discussed above,
was raised in 2010 during the Universal Periodic Review of the Gambia before the UN Human
Rights Council.225 Recent human rights reports by the United States and the United Kingdom
also highlight the Gambia’s continued noncompliance with the ECOWAS Court’s judgments.226
In sum, although the ECOWAS Court is still a young international tribunal with an uncertain future, the Court has survived two major challenges to the exercise its human rights authority, arguably emerging stronger for having weathered those travails. The judges are also aware
of ongoing concerns about noncompliance and are responding both in their jurisprudence and
in actions outside the courtroom. Finally, as we discuss below in our conclusion, the ECOWAS
Court’s status as a human rights court is far more settled than that of subregional community
courts elsewhere in Africa.
IV. EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ECOWAS COURT’S REDEPLOYMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHTS COURT
This part considers the theoretical implications of the ECOWAS Court’s redeployment. The
broad delegation of human rights authority to the ECOWAS Court is likely to elicit incredulity
from those who expect African leaders to be jealous of their sovereignty and to tightly control
the international institutions that they create. This expectation is reflected in rational functionalist international relations theory, which assumes that states delegate authority to international institutions only when doing so furthers narrowly conceived functional objectives. We
agree that state interests and sovereignty matter, and that the creation of a far-reaching and
domestically intrusive international human rights review mechanism in West Africa is surprising. We are not, however, surprised that an international institution created to achieve one
objective evolved to take on very different functions or that such an institution developed in
a way that constrains the discretion of governments.
In the subsections that follow, we contrast rational functionalist theories with historical
institutionalist accounts, which recognize that institutions can evolve over time to become
quite different from what the founders first envisioned. We then return to part I’s discussion
of how the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s reoriented regional politics and ECOWAS
institutions in ways that opened a door for NGOs, Community officials, and judges to expand
224
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the ECOWAS Court’s mandate. Finally, we address the puzzle of how the court reform campaign—triggered by a desire to increase judicial enforcement of ECOWAS economic rules—
ended up as a delegation of expansive human rights authority.
Mechanisms of Change in International Institutions
Toward the end of the twentieth century, the increasing number and influence of international institutions called into question the long-standing claim of realist scholars that states
pursue their national interests above all else. Seeking to explain these developments, scholars
spawned an extensive literature that merges rational choice institutional analysis, functional
analysis, and realist assumptions about state behavior. This literature proceeds from the premise that international institutions and regimes are primarily either mechanisms for states to
coordinate to achieve joint gains or vehicles for powerful nations to influence the behavior of
weaker states.227
These rationalist approaches assume that the design of international institutions is shaped
by functional goals, such as addressing the structural features of underlying cooperation problems while accommodating diverse state capabilities and interests.228 These approaches also
identify the mechanisms by which states control international institutions, including appointment processes, allocation of budgets, voting rules, political vetoes, and threats of noncompliance. Although state control remains incomplete, governments are expected to oppose
activities that compromise important national interests.229
Rationalist scholars recognize that international institutions can change over time. In the
case of global terrorism, for example, a fundamental shift in the nature of the cooperation problem resulted in modifications of institutional competences. Similarly, changes in membership,
relative power, or state interests can lead to revisions of decision-making rules and other design
features, such as occurred with the transformation from the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade into the World Trade Organization. In these and other instances, however, the underlying assumption is that international institutions remain closely tethered to the interests of
governments.
Historical institutionalist theory proceeds from different premises. The theory does not
assume that the primary goal of the actors who populate institutions is to meet government
demands. Instead, when elections, economic crises, exogenous shocks, or policy failures change
state and societal preferences, institutions come under pressure to respond and evolve. Initial
227
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design choices and vested interests interact with shifts in the environment to produce pathdependent change.230 These contestations and the adaptation that they engender are a normal
part of politics.
Contemporary historical institutionalist work focuses in depth on the modalities of institutional evolution. Early studies emphasized inertia and suggested that major policy reorientations occur primarily during critical junctures—infrequent moments of political, social, or
economic upheaval when an unusual opening of political space enables the overturning of
entrenched ideas and approaches.231 Recent scholarship focuses on incremental shifts that
occur through political contestation and realignments of coalitions that support institutions.
These more gradual changes can cumulate into transformations that are as large as, or larger
than, the changes that occur during critical junctures.232
Two modalities of incremental change are especially relevant to the institutional transformations in ECOWAS. Change initially occurred via “layering”—the addition of rules, goals,
or priorities that over time can become defining features of the institution.233 We argue that
the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s expanded the Community’s mandate and created
concomitantly greater constraints on state sovereignty due to expanding conceptions of
regional security. These incremental shifts, in turn, created a permissive environment for nonstate actors to convince states to give the ECOWAS Court a human rights jurisdiction. The
addition of private litigant access in human rights cases led to the Court’s “conversion” or
“redeployment,” a change that allowed new actors to redirect the institution toward new goals,
functions, and purposes.234
Layering: From Economic Integration to Regional Security, Good Governance, and
Human Rights
As we discussed in part I, although the founding goals of ECOWAS emphasized economic
integration and development, West African governments also created a limited security role for
the Community. The 1978 Protocol of Non-aggression pledged member states to refrain from
threats or use of force and from “encouraging or condoning acts of subversion” in neighboring
230
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countries,235 and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense promised a collective
response to foreign aggression.236 For more than a decade, these Protocols remained mostly
ornamental symbols of the Community’s postcolonial commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states.237 In the early 1990s, however, Liberia’s civil war spilled
over into Sierra Leone, generating mass atrocities and refugee flows. In response, the member
states, led by Nigeria, invoked the dormant security protocols to justify military intervention
to quell the violence and prevent the spread of instability.
The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s were a watershed for ECOWAS in several
respects. First, the interventions were a sharp break from the norm of noninterference in internal affairs.238 The collective response to mass atrocities on the territory of one of their own,
despite vociferous protestations by some francophone member states, revealed that African
governments were willing to limit national sovereignty to achieve other Community goals.
Political leaders initially identified these goals as the immediate need to restore peace and security in particular countries. Over time, however, the goals expanded to a broader conception
of regional conflict prevention that included constitutional transitions of power, good governance, and human rights. Court reform advocates stressed that this expansion “reoriented
thinking [in West Africa] about jurisdictional sovereignty.”239
Second, the interventions exposed gaps in ECOWAS legal instruments that created opportunities for a wider overhaul of the Community. The member states’ decision to put security
issues on a firmer legal footing occurred at the same time as the high-level review of the integration project and the decision to create the ECOWAS Court. The Committee of Eminent
Persons, convened in 1991 to assess the shortcomings of ECOWAS’s founding period and propose institutional reforms, gave equal emphasis to security and economic issues. The committee defined security broadly as including “peace and stability” within states, and it highlighted
that the “whirlwind of political reform sweeping through various parts of the world [has not]
exempted West Africa, where demands for democratisation, based on political pluralism and
respect for human rights, have multiplied in recent times.”240 Whereas the 1975 ECOWAS
Treaty “d[id] not mention human rights and completely avoid[ed] any use of human rights
language,”241 following the Committee’s recommendations the 1993 Revised Treaty identified the African Charter as a “fundamental principle” of ECOWAS.242 These revisions created
another facilitating condition for the member states’ later decision to give the ECOWAS Court
jurisdiction over human rights.
235
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Third, although the member states justified the interventions on humanitarian grounds,
ECOMOG forces sadly added to the humanitarian tragedy. The “numerous reports of
ECOMOG peacekeepers engag[ing] in looting, expropriation and theft” and accusations of

“human-rights abuses, and sexual exploitation of women and children . . . bespoke of the lack
of discipline and accountability of the armed forces of the countries involved, especially
Nigeria.”243 The abuses and subsequent lack of accountability highlighted that the Community had “not done enough to incorporate human rights in its conflict resolution initiative[s].”244 These events also triggered “a re-examination of the role of human rights in
guaranteeing regional stability and security in ECOWAS,”245 adding to the “demands for
democratisation, based on political pluralism and respect for human rights” from civil society
groups that now had input into Community decision making.246
Taken together, the layered-on addition of these broad security goals fundamentally shifted
ECOWAS’s normative orientation, a change exemplified by the 1999 Conflict Prevention Protocol and the 2001 Good Governance Protocol discussed in part II. This shift helps to explain
why the arguments of court reform advocates resonated with government and Community
officials, who saw advantages to fulfilling the pledge to give the ECOWAS Court “the power
to hear . . . cases relating to violations of human rights,”247 and to taking a concrete step toward
creating a more “people-centered” Community.248 Compared to authorizing collective military intervention in a member state, empowering the Court to adjudicate individual human
rights violations was a relatively modest step.
Redeployment: Why Human Rights Have Eclipsed Economic Issues in the ECOWAS Court
The expansion of the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction to include human rights did not supplant the Court’s original mandate to interpret and apply Community economic rules. Seen
from this perspective, the 2005 Protocol is an example of “layering”—the addition of a new
goal or priority to an existing institution that also retains its original mandate. In practice, however, the ECOWAS Court functions primarily as an international human rights tribunal, and
its docket is bereft of cases challenging violations of Community economic rules. The Court’s
transformation is thus more accurately viewed an example of “redeployment” or “conversion,”
a change that allows a new set of actors to fundamentally reorient an institution in a new
direction.
The absence of a practical role for the Court in enforcing regional economic rules does not
mean that member states have abandoned cooperation in that area. ECOWAS continues to
advertise its one-sentence mission as “promot[ing] economic integration in all fields of economic activity,”249 and the Community has made meaningful policy steps toward this goal.
For example, the 2005 Protocol enhanced the Court’s role in overseeing compliance with
243
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ECOWAS economic rules by permitting preliminary references from national courts and
authorizing enforcement actions by the ECOWAS Commission.250 In addition, since the 2006
overhaul of the Community, it can be argued persuasively that ECOWAS rules are now directly
applicable in national legal orders, with the consequence that judges should, in theory, be able
to apply those rules directly.
But significant barriers to enforcing economic rules persist. As a formal matter, although
ECOWAS protocols are directly applicable, the member states have not created “legislative provisions that ‘speak to’ the relations between [Community and domestic] legal systems.”251 In
addition, national judges and lawyers have little knowledge of how the ECOWAS legal system
is designed to function. Without formal rules or habituated practices, national judges are disinclined to invalidate conflicting national laws or to refer cases to the ECOWAS Court.
Member states might have reduced these barriers had the 2005 Protocol given private traders
direct access to the ECOWAS Court. The absence of such access from the 2005 reforms is one
of the most puzzling aspects of the Court’s transformation. It is especially so in the wake of the
Afolabi case, which directly raised the issue of economic actors not having standing before the
Court.252
Explaining why access for private traders vanished from the court reform campaign requires
us to search for “dogs that did not bark,” an inquiry that is necessarily no more than suggestive.
Our research reveals two plausible explanations for this omission: no regionally organized constituency sought the vigorous enforcement of ECOWAS economic rules, and court reform
advocates strategically conflated human rights and economic freedoms and then sacrificed
direct access of one to achieve the other.
The first explanation is true but insufficient. Economic interest groups are present in
West Africa, and they are aware of the many obstacles to intraregional trade. We interviewed
the leadership of one of these groups, the National Association of Nigeria Traders (NANTs),
whose officials are knowledgeable about the ECOWAS legal system.253 They identified specific
practices in Ghana and Nigeria that violate Community economic rules, including border closings and impediments to establishing a business, and they showed us letters of complaint filed
with the ECOWAS Commission. To enhance their ability to challenge these violations,
NANTs recently asked West African governments to allow private firms direct access to the
Court.254
NANTs was not, however, part of the 2005 court reform campaign. One impediment
to its inclusion was that the group is nationally organized, whereas ECOWAS rules only allow
for participation by regional groups. But ECOWAS officials could have facilitated the mobilization of economic groups, or national traders with a presence in multiple countries could
have organized regionally. Perhaps such groups did not see any benefit from using ECOWAS
institutions to promote their objectives. But then one has to ask why they would not adopt
a strategy that worked so well for human rights groups. Our answer is that West African
250
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governments benefit from maintaining barriers to intraregional trade and that these benefits, at least in the current political and economic climate, outweigh the advantages of
achieving a functioning common market. In the words of a recent NANTs newsletter, “Member States did not desire the Court to be an engine for realizing the economic integration
objective.”255
Although economic groups did not gain direct access to the Court in the 2005 reforms,
human rights groups did, and they have since capitalized on this access by filing numerous suits
against governments. To convert the Court to their objective, these groups argued that the
Community’s recently endorsed goal of protecting human rights and its long-standing plan to
promote economic development were one and the same. Many West African scholars, NGOs,
and litigants strategically conflate the goals of economic integration and the protection of
human rights. For example, one such scholar, Nneoma Nwogu, points to provisions in the
1993 Treaty that embrace social values, including human rights, and argues that these values
are fundamental to the Community’s economic motivations.256 Our interviews revealed a
similar tendency to elide these objectives. A human rights attorney told us that ECOWAS was
created in response to problems, such as Nigeria’s expulsion of West Africans in the 1970s,
that implicated both economic and human rights issues.257 The applicant’s lawyer in the
Afolabi case also invoked both the African Charter’s human right to freedom of movement and
ECOWAS’s free-movement obligations, seemingly drawing on the growing human rights zeitgeist to bolster Afolabi’s legal claim.258
Court reform advocates may have genuinely believed that human rights encompass economic freedoms, but they also must have been aware that the two legal fields intersect only in
part. It is more likely that advocates strategically conflated the two fields to suggest that giving
the Court a human rights mandate would also further ECOWAS’s primary objective of promoting regional integration. Governments and ECOWAS officials were seemingly happy to go
along with this diversion.
The strategy worked. But as the NANTs newsletter explains, the ability to file human rights
complaints with the ECOWAS Court does not help to challenge most economic violations,
such as a Ghanaian law that privileges domestic traders and requires significant cash investments for foreigners to establish a business.259 In reality, then, the decision to grant direct access
only for human rights reflects a political choice to prioritize one set of Community goals over
another. The ironic result is that, notwithstanding that the Afolabi suit triggered a major revision of the ECOWAS Court’s protocol, litigants like Afolabi are still unable to challenge the
many barriers to intraregional trade in West Africa.
Our principal theoretical claim is that international institutions, like their domestic counterparts, respond and adapt to changing norms and societal pressures. Even if rational func255
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tionalist goals shape an international institution’s initial design, those objectives do not control
how the institution evolves over time. We have suggested that the ECOWAS Court’s transformation is a result of the incremental layering on of new security roles for the Community together with civil society pressures to entrench respect for human rights. ECOWAS’s
contested involvement in humanitarian intervention brought human rights concerns into
Community politics. Eager to prevent civil wars and violent unrest in the region, ECOWAS
assumed a conflict prevention role and then expanded its activities to include promoting
constitutional transitions, good governance, and human rights. These developments created
a permissive environment for civil society groups and ECOWAS judges to lobby member
states to give the Court a human rights jurisdiction, in part by arguing that doing so would
also further economic integration. In practice, however, the choices made by government
leaders, Community officials, and NGOs implicitly maintained the barriers to judicial
enforcement of regional economic rules while facilitating a wave of human rights complaints
by private litigants that completed the Court’s redeployment.
V. CONCLUSION: HOW DEEP IS ECOWAS’S COMMITMENT TO PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS?
This article has examined the transformation of the ECOWAS Community Court of
Justice into a new international human rights court for West Africa. Our study reveals that the
ECOWAS Court belongs on any list of human rights tribunals. Most such lists are limited to
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies linked to specific human rights treaties, such as the African
Charter system and the African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Although the ECOWAS Court exercises jurisdiction over fewer states, it is at least as active in
adjudicating human rights violations as are these two continent-wide institutions. The Court
issues judgments quickly and provides legally binding remedies to victims who have direct
access to the Court without exhausting local remedies. Moreover, as scholars such as Solomon
Ebobrah have shown, ECOWAS judges have addressed many issues that have yet to come before the African Commission or Court and are making important contributions to regional
human rights jurisprudence.260
In this last part, we briefly consider three issues relating to whether a redeployed international human rights court can survive in the rough and tumble world of African politics. The
first issue concerns the sincerity of states’ commitment to the ECOWAS Court’s human rights
jurisdiction. The second is whether the ECOWAS Court is likely to face a backlash similar to
those that the East African Court of Justice and the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community have experienced. Finally, we discuss whether the overlapping human
rights competences between the subregional courts and the African Charter system will contribute to the fragmentation of international law in ways that undermine legal certainty and
respect for human rights.
260
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Skeptics of the Court’s expansion into human rights have suggested that the 2005 Protocol
was an insincere commitment by ECOWAS member states.261 They have intimated that
West African leaders agreed to the Protocol not out of a desire to remedy human rights violations in the region but rather because they expected that the ECOWAS Court, whatever its
powers on paper, would have little influence on national laws or practices.262
We found no evidence to support this claim. The 2005 Protocol’s specific grant of “jurisdiction to determine cases of violation of human rights that occur in any member state” was
drafted, vetted, and approved in the same manner as other ECOWAS legal instruments. If some
government officials predicted that the Protocol would be ignored, they were misinformed or
turned a blind eye to the plain language of the agreement.263 States also declined to extend private litigant access to economic cases, a decision that suggests a careful choice about which types
of suits private litigants would be permitted to file. It is noteworthy that states later rejected
plausible proposals to curtail the Court’s human rights authority and adopted reforms that
strengthened the independence and quality of ECOWAS judges. Taken together, these actions
suggest that West African governments want the Court to review human rights complaints.
As noted in the introduction, the ECOWAS Court’s expansion into human rights is not
unique. In the 1970s, the European Court of Justice made a similar shift, albeit for different
reasons,264 as did (more recently) the courts associated with two other subregional economic
communities in Africa—the East African Court of Justice and the Tribunal of the Southern
African Development Community. Unlike the situation of the ECOWAS Court, however,
these expansions occurred via judicial lawmaking.265 In Europe, member states later ratified
the ECJ’s jurisprudential advances, most recently when they adopted the Lisbon Treaty that
made the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding.266 The consequences of the bold
judicial assertions of human rights competence by the EACJ and SADC Tribunal are still
unfolding, but early evidence indicates that both courts have faced substantial opposition from
governments.267
In response to an early controversial ruling involving appointments to the East African Legislative Assembly, member states amended the East African Community Treaty to divide the
East African Court of Justice into two divisions (first instance and appellate), impose strict time
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limits on filing complaints, and add new grounds for removing and suspending judges.268
The Court later interpreted the Treaty as conferring a limited mandate to adjudicate human
rights issues. Government officials have since repeatedly challenged the Court’s jurisdiction
over human rights suits.269 In Southern Africa, the reaction has been more severe. Beginning
in 2008, the SADC Tribunal upheld suits by white farmers challenging land seizures in
Zimbabwe as violating the human rights and rule-of-law provisions in the SADC Treaty.270
President Robert Mugabe responded to these decisions by mobilizing the SADC’s highest
political body to suspend the Tribunal pending the drafting of a new protocol that strips its
jurisdiction over complaints from private litigants. These measures have ended, at least for the
foreseeable future, the SADC Tribunal’s ability to adjudicate human rights claims.271
The ECOWAS Court’s experience is different in several respects. First, unlike their colleagues in eastern and southern Africa, ECOWAS judges do not need to finesse whether they
have a human rights competence, because member states have expressly given the Court jurisdiction to review and remedy human rights violations. Second, West African governments
conferred this jurisdiction on the Court for reasons internal to the Community—namely,
ECOWAS’s growing role in regional security and a desire to facilitate constitutional transitions
and good governance. Third, the supranational status of ECOWAS is further advanced than the
other two subregional integration projects. In 2006, ECOWAS member states made Community protocols directly applicable in national legal orders without the need for ratification and
enhanced the supranational authority of ECOWAS institutions. By contrast, the SADC and,
to a lesser extent, EAC remain predominantly interstate bodies whose secretariats are largely
reactive to shifts in governments’ commitments to community and integration. Fourth, the
ECOWAS Court’s human rights mandate enjoys the strong support of the ECOWAS Commission, whose officials can help assess the political landscape and redirect opposition to the Court
in ways that address member states’ concerns without compromising the judges’ independence. Taken together, these differences explain why the ECOWAS Court’s human rights mandate stands on politically and legally firmer footing than that of its subregional neighbors, and
why the Court has survived unpopular judgments and a campaign to curtail its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the challenge of eliciting compliance with the ECOWAS Court’s judgments
remains formidable.272 But this problem must be put in perspective. The European Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights took decades to establish their
authority, whereas subregional tribunals in Africa are still in their infancy. ECOWAS judges
have demonstrated political savvy as they navigate this fraught terrain. The judges have been
circumspect in interpreting international law and in modulating the remedies that they award
to successful applicants. Such strategies help to establish a politically safe space for the
268
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Court—a space in which it can condemn clear violations of human rights and pressure governments outside the courtroom to comply with its rulings.
Many government officials, human rights groups and lawyers anticipate that the member
states will eventually specify which human rights treaties can be adjudicated by the ECOWAS
Court, add an exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement, and create an appellate review
mechanism. These revisions, if they do occur, should not be seen as rebukes of either the Court
or its judges. Rather, such revisions are more likely to reflect a maturing legal system that is
evolving in conjunction with fundamental reorientations of ECOWAS objectives.
A final issue concerns whether the multiplicity of human rights adjudicatory bodies is problematic insofar as it exacerbates the fragmentation of international law in Africa. Scholars who
express concerns about fragmentation cite the lack of clarity from inconsistent legal rulings and
the fear that governments may use that inconsistency to follow the most lenient interpretations
of their human rights obligations.273 The ECOWAS Court contributed to these fragmentation
concerns in one high-profile case—a judgment against Senegal that it violated the rights of
former Chadian President Hissein Habré by taking steps to prosecute him for torture and other
international crimes.274 The Court disallowed the prosecution, and in a later ICJ proceeding,
Senegal argued that it had delayed prosecuting Habré due to its obligation to comply with the
ECOWAS Court judgment.275
Although other examples may arise, the adjudication of human rights by the ECOWAS
Court enhances, on balance, the clarity of international law and raises, not lowers, human
rights protections in West Africa. For civil society groups, the ECOWAS Court and other subregional tribunals offer a way to minimize the “obstruction, haggling, [and] delay” that many
observers associate with the continental human rights system.276 For lawyers, subregional litigation provides a corrective to the limited avenues of legal recourse available to victims of
rights abuses in Africa.277 For judges on subregional courts, the adjudication of human rights
provides an opportunity to expand their dockets, develop legal doctrine, and issue rulings that
are relevant to stakeholders. If the courts’ decisions also complement or extend the norms of
the African Charter, so much the better.278
This conclusion has provided only a cursory overview of the many issues implicated by
the burgeoning of international human rights litigation in Africa. The contemporaneous move
273
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into human rights by three similarly situated subregional community courts, together with the
increasing activity of the African Charter institutions, creates a natural experiment to examine
the different ways that government officials, judges, and civil society groups mobilize and navigate the often fraught politics of human rights compliance. Our initial review of this experiment suggests that the manner in which international courts acquire jurisdiction over human
rights is legally and politically consequential. The mode of acquisition affects issues such as the
strategies of litigants, the interpretive methodologies of judges, the remedies awarded, and
the responses of governments to the courts’ exercise of their newly acquired authority.279 The
explicit delegation of human rights authority also provides international judges with a political
buffer as they take on the challenging task of adjudicating state violations of human rights.
279
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International Tribunals, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 445 ( Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (suggesting
a connection between the institutional structure of international courts and the types of treaty interpretation
adopted by their judges).

